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"Thus far [Law and Economics and Critical Legal Theo-
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other ... The promise of a new, comprehensive 
approach to legal scholarship . . . lies in the possibility 
that these two movements could develop a unified schol-
arly discourse."l 
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INTRODUCTION 
The great divide among scholars regarding business law matters and 
government undertakings is between those who advocate for using theo-
ries of welfare-maximization derived from the study of market forces and 
those who urge that fairness and other deontological concerns should 
predominate in private and public decision processes. The former group, 
largely comprising of law and economic scholars, seeks to ensure that 
decisions lead to efficiency so that society derives the maximum benefit 
from all available sources of welfare.2 The latter group, consisting of 
varied perspectives and sometimes categorized collectively as deontolo-
gists, share a common concern that justice and more ideational values are 
being sacrificed at the altar of efficiency to the detriment of society's 
2 These include not only economic goods, such as goods and services, but more intangi-
ble sources of individual well-being. 
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overall well-being. As scholarship from these two perspectives evolve 
over time, the law and economics group endeavors to incorporate hu-
manistic concerns raised by the deontologists but avoid compromising 
the primacy of efficiency; on the other hand, scholars from the deonto-
logical perspective undertake to master the technical aspects of effi-
ciency analysis but primarily to demonstrate critically that efficiency 
analysis is morally defective. Regardless of the perspective taken, how-
ever, one conclusion held in common among these groups is that a trade-
off between efficiency and fairness necessarily exists. Of course, the 
members of each group have a different view of which goal should be 
compromised. 
This article will demonstrate that a trade-off between efficiency and 
fairness is not essential to reaching the goals each group seeks.3 To the 
contrary, the two analytic perspectives must ally themselves to ascertain 
what states are optimal for society to choose, from both fairness and 
efficiency criteria. This does not imply that the inquiry should be about 
efficiency or fairness separately, and then struggle to determine which 
compromises between the two are best for society. What this article 
shows is that for any society, fairness and efficiency concerns yield a 
multiplicity of options that satisfy both of their respective criteria. One 
can either determine which of the possible states of the world are the 
most fair and then select the most efficient from among them or one can 
seek to determine which of the possible states are the most efficient and 
then select the most fair.4 
As explained thus far, one might surmise that the choice is the same 
regardless of the approach taken.s There is, however, a conundrum that 
3 It is not only the deontologists and the law and economic scholars that have held the 
view of an unavoidable trade-off between efficiency and fairness; economists have also held it 
as well. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF (1975), 
discussed infra at note 124 and accompanying text. Economics has provided the theoretical 
underpinnings of both the law and economics movement and its critics in the legal arena. 
4 It is important to note, given the controversy generated by Louis Kaplow & Steven 
Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REv. 961 (2001), that the definition of fair-
ness used here is the more generic, broad-based one and not the more specialized concept that 
Kaplow and Shavell use. See infra text accompanying notes 137-154. Harvard Law Review 
chose to publish the authors' book in its entirety in one issue of the journal. The citation of the 
book is LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2002). The page references herein are to the journal issue. 
S It is not difficult to see that there will be fair choices that are efficient. Using the 
Pareto criteria, discussed at text associated with infra notes 90-97, assume you have a state of 
the world that is deemed fair. It is not efficient. By definition, if it is not efficient that means 
it is possible to rearrange the distribution of goods, rights and other concerns so that at least 
one person feels better off and no one else feels worse off. This takes into consideration all 
aspects of people's sense of well-being, both before and after the distribution. Since this latter 
state exists (because of the assumption that the initial fair distribution was not efficient) this 
redistribution would be preferred over the initial one. As explained at infra notes 90-97, such 
re-distribution can continue until reaching a state that is both fair and efficient. 
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prevents the existence of one, unique optimal choice. Though it has been 
recognized in a variety of contexts, either explicitly or implicitly, that a 
proper efficiency analysis will lead to a multiplicity of possible efficient 
choices, it has not been adequately recognized that fairness analysis also 
leads to a multiplicity of "fair" choices-the differences among them 
largely depending on the values of the particular decision-maker. This 
means that just as efficiency analysis leads to multiple options, so do 
fairness concerns. Using the twin criteria of efficiency and fairness will 
not yield necessarily a unique choice but more likely a subset of choices 
from the overlap of the set of efficient and the set of fair possibilities. 
The choice of which state actually to pursue from this smaller subset 
becomes a "political" choice because the "optimal" choice depends on 
the decision-maker's own subjective evaluation. 
This article will discuss how to refine the set of choices that are 
both "fair" and "efficient" in order to limit the "political" aspect of the 
decision to remain within the boundaries of what is, by social consensus, 
fair. This article proposes a concept of "parameters of fairness" to bound 
the range of acceptable efficient choices to stay within the scope of fair 
choices. The concept and set of the parameters of fairness are drawn 
from notions of fairness that have evolved from our jurisprudence over 
time. Just as the set of efficient choices is bound by the parameters of 
fairness, however, viewing the process the other way, that is, selecting 
first the fair choices based on the parameters of fairness and then select-
ing the efficient ones from that set, bounds the fair choices to those that 
are also efficient. Heuristically, whichever approach is taken, the set of 
possible optimal choices for society should be the same and the extent of 
the political aspects would be the same as well. This article argues that 
this process represents the maximization of welfare from both efficient 
and fairness viewpoints. Though the process is still not determinative of 
a unique choice, it does yield a set of choices. The decision-maker's 
preferences determine which choice to pursue, and therefore, the deci-
sion is, in that sense, political. 
In order to provide a specific example of how deontological and 
efficiency goals do not conflict but in fact support each other, this article 
examines a particular business law problem: the undue incidence of busi-
ness harm inflicted on members of the community. Economic theory 
shows that businesses engage in cost-benefit reasoning to guide their de-
cisions, a methodology of overt controversy both as a policy tool and a 
descriptor of private corporate behavior. Law and economic analysts 
strongly advocate cost-benefit's use because of its efficiency impJica-
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tions6 while deontologists express consternation at the potential for unac-
ceptable consequences.? Though the usual assessment by both sides is 
that any resolution to the disagreement must involve a trade-off between 
efficiency and fairness, this article shows otherwise. Applying the con-
joined frameworks of fairness and efficiency criteria, this article demon-
strates that the problem of undue business harm lies not with the cost-
benefit approach but with the failure of the parameters of fairness to ade-
quately consider the concerns of all members of the community. By 
turning toward deontological methodology, however, it is possible to ex-
pand the parameters of fairness to address the specific concerns raised by 
business harm and the use of cost-benefit reasoning without compromis-
ing the criteria of efficiency. The particular deontological methodology 
this article draws on is feminist jurisprudence's ethic of care. The focus 
is not on gender issues but rather on the methods to expand notions of 
fairness that feminism evolved. Employing feminist analytic techniques 
to redress the specific concerns of cost-benefit reasoning shows how an 
application of a deontological philosophy can extend the parameters of 
fairness to enhance social welfare overall. Moreover, expansions in the 
parameters of fairness further narrow the scope of the political aspects of 
decision-making without compromising efficiency. 
Part I of this article presents the problem of harmful business con-
duct, noting how mainstream analyses have failed to resolve the concern 
satisfactorily. Suggesting that alternative approaches to legal problems 
may be of assistance, this section considers the literature collectively 
known as "outsider scholarship." Though generally developed to address 
the concerns of groups suffering discrimination, one field of outsider 
scholarship-feminist analysis-appears fruitful for adaptation to the 
problem of business harm. Part II gives an overview of the feminist 
method, in particular describing the concept of the excluded voice and 
the principle of the ethic of care for use later when proposing fair solu-
tions regarding harm from business decisions that are also efficient. 
Part III describes how the typical business structure lends itself to 
the possibility of undue business harm and when in the business deci-
sion-making process the potential for deleterious conduct arises. In par-
ticular, this section describes in some detail the business use of cost-
benefit analysis to guide its profit-maximizing decisions and how deci-
sions regarding risk of harm enter that process. Part III then continues 
with both the law and economics' arguments that the process reflects 
6 See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, On Justifying Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1037 (2000); Michael Abramowicz, Toward a Jurisprudence of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
100 MICH. L. REV. 1708 (2002). 
? See generally, Martha C. Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 1. LEGAL STUD. 971 (2000); Henry S. Richardson, The Stupidity of 
the Cost-Benefit Standard, 29 1. LEGAL STUD. 971 (2000). 
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society's choices on risk as well as the criticisms of those arguments. 
Part IV lays the foundation for the later application of the parameters of 
fairness. It describes the extent to which economic efficiency analysis 
contributes to enhancements of social well-being but also its limitations. 
Using Pareto efficiency criteria, this section explains why efficiency 
analysis necessarily leads to a multiplicity of efficient states, the most 
preferred selection from which Pareto analysis can offer no guidance. 
The indeterminacy inherent in Pareto criteria regarding which potential 
efficient state to pursue not only characterizes efficiency analysis's limi-
tations but also delineates the scope for deontological choices in the deci-
sion process. This section also discusses efforts to reduce the 
indeterminacy through expansion of efficiency criteria and the reasons 
why such efforts nevertheless resort to some form of deontological 
choice to do so. There is a brief discussion with regard to recent efforts 
to improve the application of cost-benefit analysis specifically. 
Part V more directly addresses the question of trade-offs between 
efficiency and fairness and argues that to the contrary, a decision regard-
ing efficient states necessarily requires deontological decisions as well; 
those deontological decisions do not substitute for efficiency but compli-
ment it. Part V also considers, in this context, the implications of the 
work of Kaplow and Shavell, which argues that fairness concerns should 
never enter as an independent factor when seeking to maximize social 
welfare. Part V shows that Kaplow and Shavell's conclusion rests on a 
narrow definition of fairness, one that has been stripped of all of its so-
cial-welfare enhancing properties. Though their definition of fairness 
does not comport with usual notions and purposes of fairness, their argu-
ments nevertheless offer insights for defining the parameters of fairness. 
Part VI presents the concept of the "parameters of fairness" and dis-
cusses how they coalesce with efficiency criteria to enhance social wel-
fare overall. In particular, the section discusses the parameters of 
fairness's role in social choices as well as in private decision-making. 
Part VII gives a specific example of expanding the parameters of fairness 
to address certain problems in cost-benefit criteria by considering a par-
ticular deontological approach, feminist jurisprudence. This part 
presents how feminist techniques can address particular social concerns 
for general consideration as well as demonstrate how feminist methods 
can address the particular concern of undue business harm. Throughout 
the analysis it is clear that efficiency goals have not been compromised 
but fairness goals have been advanced in a manner that enhances social 
welfare overall. 8 A conclusion follows Part VII. 
8 Other scholars have proposed possible synergies between feminist and law and eco-
nomic theory. See, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, Feminism and Eutrophic Methodologies, in FEMI-
NISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS (Martha A. Fineman & Terence Dougherty eds., 2005) 
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I. HARMFUL BUSINESS CONDUCT 
A. MAINSTREAM ASSESSMENT 
There is no question that legal and policy conundrums regarding 
business often defy happy resolution by traditional analyses. Many co-
nundrums make their appearance in the course of conduct by corpora-
tions or other business entities that inflict harm on community members. 
Examples are victimization wreaked upon consumers,9 neighbors to the 
production process, 10 employees, II or investors. 12 Sometimes the victim 
is society as a whole, as when the environment is harmed 13 or large num-
bers of employees lose their jobs or investors their savings. 14 Resolu-
tions to avoid these harms or provide adequate compensation often seem 
elusive. Legal hurdles to prove legal causality and liabilityl5 and lack of 
business assets prevent injured plaintiffs from being compensated. 16 The 
nature and direction of economic growth is predominately dictated by 
(demonstrating how law and economics can be useful to feminist analysis); Janis Sarra, The 
Gender Implications of Corporate Governance Change, I SEATfLE J. FOR Soc. JUST. 457 
(2002) (combining feminist analysis and law and economics to address corporate issues). 
9 The drug Diethylstilbesterol (DES) was administered to pregnant women to prevent 
miscarriages, but it also caused cancer in many of the female children who were born to these 
mothers. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 
(1980). 
10 Children and others allegedly died of leukemia and other illnesses after exposure to 
toxic solvents from nearby manufacturers that leaked into the municipal water wells. Ander-
son v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1222 (D. Mass. 1986), ajJ'd sub nom, Anderson 
v. Cryovac, ,Inc., 862 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1988); see also In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant 
Disaster at Bhopal India, in December 1984,634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (prevailing 
winds blew a toxic gas leak from a plant into a densely populated area resulting in at least 
2,100 deaths and over 200,000 injured). 
I I Employees were exposed to hazardous conditions caused by noxious chemicals at 
their place of employment. Blakenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chern., Inc., 433 N.E.2d 572 
(Ohio 1982), cert. denied, 49 U.S. 857 (1982). 
12 A $50 billion write-off by Worldcom in 2002 due to manipulation of reserves and 
overstated earnings during the previous three years caused Worldcom's shares to drop from 
$65/share to mere pennies causing investors to lose hundreds of millions of dollars. See In re 
WorldCom, Inc. Securities Litigation, 294 F. Supp.2d 392, 398, 401-02 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), cert. 
denied, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 92,616 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
13 See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 
N.Y.UL REv. 115 (2004) (discussing why private industry fails to protect against environ-
mental consequences such as destruction of wetlands, the ozone layer, and clean water). 
14 The collapse of Enron share value from $90 to $0.60 not only caused investors to lose 
$63 billion, but over 4000 employees lost their jobs and, as 60% of their retirement pensions 
were invested mandatorily in Enron stock, they lost most of their retirement funds as well. 
William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TuL. L. REV. 1275, 
1276-77 (2002). See also Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclo-
sure, and Enron, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 394 (2004). 
15 Plaintiff could not identify which of the defendant DES manufacturers produced the 
drug plaintiffs mother took that caused plaintiffs cancer. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 926. 
16 For example, Johns-Manville Corporation filed for bankruptcy protection, despite the 
fact that it was solvent, to avoid paying damages arising from asbestos litigation. See Lee Ann 
Flyer, Comment, Will Financially Sound Corporate Debtors Succeed in Using Chapter I I of 
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businesses through the workings of the marketplace unconcerned with 
social harms, raising the question to what extent the government should 
take control. 17 Should the role of government be anticipatory through 
regulation or compensatory in its consideration of such harms? What cri-
teria should enter the assessment?18 
One widely used technique to evaluate government policy and busi-
ness decisions is cost-benefit analysis, which fashions measures of eco-
nomic benefits and weighs them against some measure of costs. If the 
benefits as measured outweigh the costs, cost-benefit analysis approves a 
particular business endeavor or government program. 19 The negative 
dimensions of those decisions are realized when the costs are suffered, 
whether socially, environmentally, or by individuals. Though policy-
makers may decide that society is better off on balance-despite the 
costs-with a particular course of action, whether by business or govern-
ment, others express unease with the drawbacks cost-benefit analysis 
seems to dictate: unredressed personal or financial harms, unemployment 
and permissible environmental damage, to name a few. The concern in-
dicates a deep reservation as to the validity of the choices cost-benefit 
analysis makes.20 
When business scholars, whether in law or economics, are con-
fronted with questions regarding the consequences of de facto permitted 
harmful business conduct, the response is often not very satisfactory. 
When the traditional tools of analyses-whether legal, economic or "law 
and economic"-do not provide some ready resolution to the objections, 
it seems to many outside the discipline of business scholarship as if the 
business scholars retreat to a position of advocating the negative condi-
tions as an inevitable cost of overall economic welfare and a necessity of 
a fair and objective legal system. One can observe some business schol-
the Bankruptcy Act as a Shield Against Massive Tort Liability? 56 TEMP. L. Q. 539, 543-44 
(1983). 
17 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW (1984) (discussing 
the shift in perspective from one that government should take only a "reactive" stance to 
complement private market activities to one that government take an "active" stance and regu-
late market activities). Enron spent millions of dollars and successfully lobbied officials 
throughout the country for energy industry exemptions from the Securities disclosure laws that 
allowed it to hide the growing liabilities that ultimately caused its collapse. See Bratton, supra 
note 14, at 1279-80. 
18 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REv. 713 (1996); Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and 
Vision, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 675, 679 (2003); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental 
Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 682 (1999) (noting a 
consensus that "incentive-based instruments such as taxes and tradeable allowances should 
generally be chosen over technology requirements and fixed emissions standards"). 
19 See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text. 
20 See, e.g., Calvin Terbeek, Love in the Time of Free Trade: NAFTA's Economic Ef-
fects Ten Years Later, 12 TuL. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 487 (2004). 
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ars actually justifying or applauding negative consequences as a sign of 
healthy growth and a balanced system of justice.21 
One might suspect that such repose or exaltation in the face of such 
dismal impacts may be the result of frustration with a framework of legal 
and economic analysis that offers no resolution for these problems. Cer-
tainly there has been a spate of renewed interest in examining the criteria 
by which policy-makers make their decisions regarding trade-offs be-
tween benefits and harms of any particular course of action.22 Though 
many business scholars work diligently to discover some aspect or tool 
within the framework that will permit reducing harmful consequences, 
the forthcoming nature of such solutions is open to question. Though the 
current search for optimal, objective, decision criteria to maximize social 
well-being or to achieve an ideal of justice in the face of trade-offs is far 
from concluded, the current trend of insights is not unfolding propi-
tiously. Though these inquiries seek to respond to objections raised 
against traditional law and economic evaluations of both public and pri-
vate cost-benefit choices over the last few decades, nevertheless the cur-
rent efforts leave an uneasy feeling of deja vu-that once again the 
endpoint will be inconclusive as to what constitutes a satisfactory "objec-
tive" approach to social choice and just ends. This provokes the question 
of whether a different framework can offer perspectives for possible so-
lutions that pursuits along more traditional lines have thus far not 
yielded. 
B. "OUTSIDER SCHOLARSHIP" 
One interesting set of candidates for alternative frameworks of anal-
yses is the group of approaches known collectively as "outsider scholar-
ship," as well as their predecessor, critical legal studies. The "outsider 
scholarship" consists primarily of feminist legal theory, critical race the-
ory, and gay legal studies, all of which focus on particular groups who 
are viewed as outside the mainstream and whose concerns are not ad-
21 "Under a common understanding of normative economic analysis, legal rules are as-
sessed by reference to wealth maximization or efficiency, criteria that many construe as omit-
ting important aspects of individuals' well-being and as ignoring distributive concerns." 
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 4, at 968 (stating that their approach is more comprehensive). 
"Myron Magnet, a reporter for FORTUNE, typified the attitudes of many when he commented: 
"Yes, many jobs are disappearing, and workers who thought they were set are having their 
lives painfully disrupted and their earnings cut through no fault of their own. Yet it's worth 
remembering ... that 'the process of job destruction is a very normal process of the econ-
omy. '" Jeanne M. Dennis, The Lessons of Comparable Worth: A Feminist Vision of Law and 
Economic Theory, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S L. J. 1,4 (1993). Such statements reveal resignation and 
obeisance to the workings of the "invisible hand" of the market." 
22 See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 4, at 968; see also infra notes 108-23. 
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dressed by the social norms.23 Their candidacy seems potentially fruitful 
because their focus is on the disenfranchised and how to both recognize 
and address the disenfranchisement. 
The complaints regarding decision-making criteria for business con-
duct focus on the inadequacy of protection or redress for victims of busi-
ness harm. In effect, the concern is the disenfranchisement of those 
victims, though the victims do not necessarily belong to any discrete so-
cial group. To the contrary, victims of business harm can cross all social 
and economic boundaries. Though outsider scholarship tends to focus on 
some particular discrete social group, that does not mean their techniques 
cannot be usefully applied to other contexts of disenfranchisement. 
These alternative fields of endeavor, however, have paid rather lim-
ited attention to business law issues directly. Critical legal studies' focus 
has been to criticize mainstream legal analysis, including "law and eco-
nomic" analysis, for its efforts to find and define objective legal stan-
dards that guide judicial decisions. Critical legal studies' attention has 
been primarily on demonstrating that, despite the wishes of mainstream 
analysis, law is inherently indeterminate and therefore cannot be objec-
tive; to the contrary, law functions to disguise or empower the social 
elites' domination of those not in the elite group.24 Thus they eschew 
any efforts to have determinate outcomes. This is in significant contrast 
to most law and economic analyses. 
Contributors to outsider scholarship primarily focus on the particu-
lar disenfranchised group of their concern. Critical race theory, in addi-
tion to criticizing critical legal studies itself for not addressing or meeting 
the needs of ethnic minorities, examines ways in which the legal climate 
discriminates against minorities and how it undermines efforts to over-
come that discrimination.25 Gay legal studies seeks to define what legal 
imbalances face gay men and lesbians.26 Only feminist theory, while 
similarly engaged in issues concerning the plight of women, has made 
more than a passing effort to expand its analytical frontiers to issues that 
23 See, e.g., Anne Coughlin, Regulating the Self: Autobiographical Performances in 
Outsider Scholarship, 81 VA. L. REV. 1229 (1995); Francisco Valdes, Aftenvard - Theorizing 
"OutCrit" Theories: Coalitional Method and Comparative Jurisprudential Experience -
RaceCrits, QueerCrits and LatCrits, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1265 (1999). . 
24 MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRmCAL LEGAL STUDIES 3-4 (1987). Critical legal stud-
ies scholars were particularly vociferous with regard to the indetenninacy inherent in law and 
economics as law and economics analysis gained ascendancy in the legal community. See, 
e.g., id. at 141-50. 
25 See generally, Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies 
Have What Minorities Want? 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 301 (1987); Mari J. Matsuda, Look-
ing to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323 
(1987). 
26 Kim Brooks & Debra Parkes, Queering Legal Education: A Project of Theoretical 
Discovery, 27 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 89 (2004). 
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do not focus on questions of gender discrimination. Indeed, there have 
been a number of articles over the past decade or so in which feminist 
and non-feminist scholars apply feminist principles to issues regarding 
business law.27 For the most part, however, the extent to which any ju-
risprudence has had a significant influence on business law issues, it is 
the law and economics approach which has controlled that terrain.28 
As is well noted, however, by both those within the feminist frame-
work and those with a law and economics perspective, there has long 
been a distrust between the two groups of scholars, one (law and eco-
nomics) perceiving the other (feminists) as lacking in serious rigor,29 the 
other seeing the former as at best failing in human compassion.3D More 
significantly, each group has historically been identified as having their 
political origins and motivations at opposite ends of the political spec-
trum, with the law and economics scholars traditionally considered polit-
ically conservative while the feminist scholars viewed as aligned with 
liberal, left and radical political perspectives.31 Regardless of the conten-
27 Examples of early notable efforts by feminists to apply feminist concepts to business 
law issues are Ronnie Cohen, Feminist Thought and Corporate Law: It's Time to Find Our 
Way Up From the Bottom (Line), 2 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. I, 6 (1994) and Theresa A. 
Gabaldon, The Lemonade Stand: Feminist and Other Reflections on the Limited Liability of 
Corporate Shareholders, 45 VAND. L. REv. 1387, 1415 (1992). See generally, Ramona L. 
Paetzold, Commentary: Feminism and Business Law: The Essential Interconnection, 31 AM. 
Bus. L. J. 699 (1994); Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re) Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, 
Mass Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L. J. 848 (1990). The earliest application 
known to this author is Kathleen A. Lahey & Sarah W. Salter, Corporate Law in Legal Theory 
and Legal Scholarship: From Classicism to Feminism, 23 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 543, 554 
(1985). 
28 "When [law and economics] ideas were produced ... business oriented people found 
their voice .... " Douglas G. Baird, The Future of Law and Economics: Looking Forward, 64 
U. CHI. L. REv. 1129, 1144 (2003) (Posner, J., Symposium). 
29 See, for example, the defense by Judge Posner, one of the foremost proponents of law 
and economics movement, to the criticism that he is critical in his book, OVERCOMING LAW 
(1995), of leading feminist scholars because they are women. He asserts he is critical of them 
not because they are women but because they are not "analytical" philosophers or not "engag-
ing the rational intellect" or whose work has an "uncertain relationship to fact" or he disagrees 
with their evaluation of scientific evidence. Richard A. Posner, Response to Clark Freshman, 
Were Patricia Williams and Ronald Dworkin Separated at Birth?, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1610 
(1995). 
30 For. cogent feminist criticisms of the law and economics efficiency debate, see Martha 
T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the Neoliberal Attack on the 
Welfare State, 78 IND. L. J. 783 (2003); Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The 
Philosophical Critique of (A Particular Type OJ) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197 (1997); 
Marianne A. Ferber, The Study of Economics: A Feminist Critique, 85 AM. EcoN. REv. 357 
(1995). For a fairly scathing attack on the use of law and economic reasoning, see Jeanne L. 
Schroeder, The End of the Market: A Psychoanalysis of Law and Economics, 112 HARV. L. 
REV. 483 (1998). 
31 See Gary Minda, The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980's, 50 OHIO ST. L. J. 599 
(1989). Similar sentiments have also been expressed by other outsider scholarship. See, e.g., 
Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 
YALE L. J. 1757 (2003). 
12 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 15:1 
tiousness between the two groups and the perceptions of those outside 
these groups, there is no question that both law and economics and femi-
nist theory have fundamentally transformed the way American legal is-
sues are addressed, albeit mostly in different areas of law.32 
It is unfortunate that two such powerful analytic tools have been 
precluded from taking advantage of the insights the other has to offer. 33 
It has been demonstrated in a variety of contexts that law and economic 
reasoning is not necessarily tied to a particular political perspective and, 
in fact, can serve other viewpoints equally well.34 Similarly, the efforts 
by scholars to apply feminist principles to non-feminist concerns such as 
business law, demonstrate that feminist analysis is not inherently solely 
about women's issues.35 
Thus one outcome of this article is to suggest how an "outsider" 
methodology, feminism, may assist law and economic reasoning on is-
sues that law and economics seems unable to resolve on its own. Simi-
larly, the hope here is to suggest that the tools law and economics 
scholarship has developed in the legal arena over the last 40 years can 
serve feminist values and goals as well. 
II. INTRODUCTION TO THE FEMINIST METHOD 
Anyone familiar with the advent of feminist thought knows that its 
focus is on the concerns of women. One might suspect, therefore, that 
32 Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Char-
acter, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV.129, 139-47 
(2003); Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1327, 1338 (2002); Richard 
A. Epstein, Law and Economics: Its Glorious Past and Cloudy Future, 64 U. CHI. REv. 1167 
(1997). 
33 A number of scholars have noted the potential of combining law and economics with 
feminist analysis in a variety of contexts, often coupled with Critical Legal Studies and other 
outsider scholarship. See generally, Edward L. Rubin, supra note 1; Gary Minda, supra note 
31; Linz Audain, Critical Legal Studies, Feminism, Law and Economics, and the Veil of Intel-
lectual Tolerance: A Tentative Case for Cross-Jurisprudential Dialogue, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 
1017 (1992). More recently, Barbara Ann White, Feminist Foundations for the Law of Busi-
ness: One Law and Economics Scholar's Survey and (Re)View, 10 UCLA WOMEN'S L. J. 39 
(1999) and Reza Dibadj, Beyond Facile Assumptions and Radical Assertions: A Case for 
"Critical Legal Economics," 2003 UTAH L. REv. 1155 (2003) have raised the issue again. 
34 For early demonstrations that value choices in law and economic analysis can traverse 
the political spectrum, see Robin Paul Malloy, Equating Human Rights and Property Rights-
the Needfor Moral Judgment in an Economic Analysis of Law and Social Policy, 47 OHIO ST. 
L. J. 163 (1986); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism, Altruism and Market Illusions: The Limits of 
Law and Economics, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1309 (1986); Barbara White, Coase and the Courts: 
Economicsfor the Common Man, 72 IOWA L. REv. 577 (1987) and subsequent works by those 
authors. Recently, there has been an increased interest by law and economics scholars in the 
role of value choices. See Claire A. Hill, Law and Economics in the Personal Sphere, 29 LAW 
& Soc. INQUIRY 219 (2003) and references therein; Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics 
Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537 (1998). 
35 See Sara Dillon, A Farewell to "Linkage": International Trade Law and Global Sus-
tainabifjty Indicators, 55 RUTGERS L. REv. 87, 146-49 (2002); see also infra note 59. 
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any contribution feminist thinking might offer business law would be on 
those aspects of business that affect women's lives. Not as well known, 
however, is that feminist thinking has developed and embraced tech-
niques of analysis that are quite different from traditional legal ap-
proaches. This unfamiliarity with feminist analytic technique contrasts 
significantly with the broad-based familiarity among legal analysts with 
law and economic reasoning.36 Admittedly, the feminist techniques 
evolved because mainstream analysis repeatedly failed to address satis-
factorily the issues of women with which feminists were concerned. 
Nevertheless, the original motivation does not preclude the emergent 
analysis from serving useful purposes in other venues as well. 
The stimulation for feminists to develop different techniques was 
the realization that mainstream analysis would always fail to illuminate 
dilemmas of gender because inherently it marginalized women. In the 
process of unveiling this marginalization, intellectual investigations gave 
rise to more revelatory analytic approaches. Though these techniques 
were designed to focus on gender concerns, their power of analysis is 
quite strong and, as is suggested here, can be extremely useful for non-
gender issues.37 What follows is an overview of certain feminist tech-
niques38 in order to demonstrate in later sections how feminist analysis 
can give a different insight into some of the difficult recurring problems 
in business law. 
A. THE "EXCLUDED VOICE" 
One of the most significant analytic contributions of feminist 
thought is its use of the "excluded voice."39 This notion arose in re-
sponse to feminists' recognition that mainstream analytic frameworks, 
which purport to be objective, are in fact biased in favor of the perspec-
tive of those in power. In particular, the concept of the "excluded voice" 
demonstrates how the legal system's administration of justice fails to 
consider the subjective experiences of those without power. The legal 
system seeks to achieve justice among and between the members of the 
power group according to the group's own sensibilities. The system, 
however, applies the same resulting standards to those outside the power 
36 Hanson & Y osifon, supra note 32, at 270-79; Epstein, supra note 32. 
37 "In fact, feminist jurisprudence now provides analytic tools that can be applied to 
virtually any legal subject or approach." Theresa A. Gabaldon, Feminism, Fairness, and Fidu-
ciary Duty in Corporate and Securities Law, 5 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1,3 (1995). 
38 There are a number of excellent articles detailing the conceptual underpinnings of 
feminist jurisprudence. The discussion of the concepts here is drawn primarily from the 
following articles: Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REv. 829 
(1990); Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REv. 617 (1990); Robin 
West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988). 
39 Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 575 
(1993). 
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group, the "other," whose characteristics are different and whose sensi-
bilities do not fit the power group's legal mold. As a result, the legal 
system's notion of fairness and accountability proves to be subjective to 
the power group rather than objective as it claims, and justice is not 
achieved for everyone. 
The effectiveness of "excluded voice" analysis is evident, for exam-
ple, when critiquing traditional notions of non-statutory rape liability. A 
man offers as his defense for his act of rape that the woman was "asking" 
for it through her style of dress or provocative conduct. Historically, 
determinations of the man's guilt were based on whether it was reasona-
ble for him to perceive consent.40 The fact that from the woman's per-
spective, she was held down, perhaps beaten, and physically penetrated 
against her will, did not hold great weight in the evaluation of the guilt or 
innocence of the male defendant. If justification could be found for the 
man's professed perception, his conviction was highly unlikely. And, as 
history shows, the social as well as legal atmosphere skewed delibera-
tions in favor of finding the man's perception as justified. ("Boys will be 
boys"; the wish not to ruin the male's career because of a moment's 
"indiscretion".). By basing the evidence and judicial determination on 
the validity of the man's seeming perspective, the woman's subjective 
experience of being raped was lost. Justice was meted out not based on 
what harm transpired against the woman, but instead on an analysis of 
the man's state of mind-with great deference paid to it as the "objec-
tive" truth.41 Thus justice did not consider the woman's subjective harm 
in its equation, the woman became the "other" and her experience be-
came an "excluded voice." This legal attitude, of course, had social im-
plications as to the mode of care or indifference a man felt compelled to 
adopt when determining if the woman he was penetrating was in fact 
consenting to it. 
Woman's excluded voice arises in a variety of arenas, aside from 
the obvious one of rape. Sexual harassment, domestic violence, financial 
equity in divorce, childcare, healthcare, and job opportunities all re-
present areas in which historically the woman's voice-her experience 
and perspective-has been excluded.42 As a result, feminists have 
evolved a variety of means to include that voice.43 One is to raise the 
40 See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 29-41 (1987). 
41 This was accomplished under the rubric of mens rea. Subjective awareness is a pre-
requisite for criminal culpability, at least for serious crimes. Some women have suggested 
therefore that negligence is a better standard. See generally Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 
1087 (1986). 
42 See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Feminism and the State, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1181 
(1994). 
43 Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered 
Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 886 (1989). 
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conscience of the decision-makers by having the woman tell her story in 
the decision-makers' forum-"consciousness-raising" through the use of 
"narrative."44 A second is to recognize inequalities in the balance of 
power between those whose voice is dominant and those whose voice is 
"excluded" and to take steps to equalize that imbalance in the decision 
process.45 An example is a health care policy that affords women preg-
nancy-related protections at their place of employment that leaves them 
in the same position as men with respect to career advantages.46 A third 
approach is to engage in "context analysis," that is, to evaluate disputes 
in the full context in which they occur rather than on the basis of abstract 
notions of neutrality to determine "fair" action.47 For example, the legal 
standard that permits an individual faced with the threat of violence to 
defend only with a physical force no greater than that threatened, ought 
to change in the context of a 110 pound female facing battery with fists 
by an abusive partner twice her size.48 
Of course, the desire to include the excluded voice relies on the 
decision-maker's conscience to value equally the well-being of the wo-
man with the rights of the man. It is quite possible, however, that the 
decision-maker him- or herself is biased in favor of the dominant voice; 
in the gender context, that would be a bias in favor of the man. The 
feminist ethic of care, another important contribution, addresses that 
concern. 
B. THE "ETHIC OF CARE" 
The "ethic of care" arose from feminists' consternation with the so-
cial tolerance for unacceptable levels of harm arising from gender bias. 
Frustrated by the mainstream attachment to notions of "neutral" treat-
ment for all individuals despite the resulting real suffering by women, 
44 Bartlett, supra note 38, at 863-67; see also Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of 
Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.V.L. REV. 589 
(1986). 
45 It is the recognition that the male "voice" (or perspective) dominates the mainstream 
legal framework that leads feminists to the analysis of patriarchy and hierarchical domination. 
"In order to become dominant, a discourse ... must exert control over the concepts and ideas 
that are understood to be the foundation of the area. Language is the medium . . . ; the 
ideology and assumptions underlying it are bought or sold by those with the ability to validate 
one discourse over another." Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, 
and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REv. 727, 736 (1988). 
See also Katharine T. Bartlett, Gender Law, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'y I (1994). 
46 See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Mater-
nity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1118 (1986); Kathryn Abrams, Gender 
Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 V AND. L. REv. 1183 (1989). 
47 See generally Peggy C. Davis, Contextual Legal Criticism: A Demonstration Explor-
ing Hierarchy and "Feminine" Style, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1635 (1991). 
48 Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of 
Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REv. 367, 377-78 (1996). 
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many feminists concluded that the willingness to tolerate harm to women 
was an outgrowth of the ethical values at the core of traditional standards 
of conduct. Feminists argue that mainstream thinking is obsessed with a 
"rights-based" sense of justice that abstracts unmercifully from the con-
text within which real individuals operate.49 ("The law denies equally 
the rich and the poor the right to sleep under the bridge."50). 
The ethic of care is an alternative moral philosophy that is needs-
based and guides community decisions according to differences among 
individuals.51 For example, workplace health care policies that accom-
modate differences in gender are easily justified under notions of fairness 
guided by an ethic of care, though less so under a rights-based sense of 
justice. The ethic of care seeks equality of well-being suggesting health 
care should meet the medical needs of both women and men though their 
needs are different, whereas a rights-based ethic suggests that a fair 
health care policy is one that is the same for all employees. The practical 
difficulties of a rights-based approach became clear when women en-
tered the workforce in greater numbers and at higher professional levels 
during the late 70's and 80'S.52 The policies in place reflected the needs 
of men, the dominant gender, with the needs of the other going unmet. 
At that time, the rights-based response to complaints by women, the "ex-
cluded voice," was that both genders had the same health care policy and 
the complaints were demands for "special" treatment. 53 
The rights-based perspective could not recognize that health care 
policies in place were already tailored to the needs of men, thus in effect 
giving them, the dominant gender, "special treatment."54 Any tailoring 
for the non-dominant gender, women, was seen as violating the rights-
based concept of equal treatment which, within its framework, is defined 
as the same treatment for all.55 In contrast, since the ethic of care's no-
49 See, e.g., Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 
YALE L. J. 1373 (1986). 
50 "The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to beg in the 
streets, steal bread, or sleep under a bridge." JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 802 
(14th ed. 1968) (quoting Anatole France). 
51 Scales, supra note 49. 
52 Findley, supra note 46. 
53 That is the implication of Justice Stewart's majority opinion in Gedu/dig v. Aiello, 417 
U.S. 484 (1974) (holding that a state insurance program excluding normal pregnancy from 
disability coverage did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because exclusion treated men 
and women equally). 
54 See id. at 497 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the state insurance program cov-
ered, among other disabilities, ones that are voluntary, e.g., cosmetic, and prostatectomies - a 
disability a woman will never experience). 
55 [d. ("The appellee ... contends that, although she has received insurance protection 
equivalent to that provided all other participating employees, she has suffered discrimination 
because she has encountered a risk that was outside the program's protection ... [W]e hold 
that this ... is not ... valid ... under the Equal Protection Clause ... "). 
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tion of equality is based on a sense of well-being rather than a doling out 
of rights, equality in health matters constitutes responding to each gen-
der's specific needs by a policy that contains equality of tailoring in its 
design.56 
The ethic of care is properly named because it relies on the deci-
sion-makers' compassion and empathy for "others" in recognizing and 
determining what is fair and just. Of course, there is no guarantee that 
the decision-makers will feel this sense of compassion. Hence, feminists 
suggest efforts to foster compassion to support an ethic of care, for ex-
ample, education emphasizing recognition and acknowledgment of 
"others" thereby raising consciousness regarding differences among indi-
viduals as well as groups. Communities should cultivate a sense of "con-
nectedness" with "others," so that all will experience individuals 
different from them as equally a part of their society and as deserving to 
have needs met.57 Moreover, techniques mentioned earlier for including 
the "excluded voice" foster the ethic of care as well: consciousness-rais-
ing through the use of narrative, correcting imbalances of power, and 
understanding individuals in the full context of their experience all serve 
to raise levels of compassion and empathy for the "other." Diversity in 
the decision-making body and throughout the organization serves these 
ends as well. 
Of course, in the bulk of the work done by feminists, the "other" is 
the female, the encouraged sense of "connectedness" is between the gen-
ders, the different needs to be met are the concerns of women and the 
balance of power to be equalized is between the sexes. Much of feminist 
philosophy, however, also seeks to extend this sensibility for all mem-
bers of society and aspires to have the ethic of care at the center of the 
legal and socio-political system as a whole.58 The feminist belief is that 
56 See Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Spe-
cial Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1985); see also Ann C. 
Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L. J. 375, 426-42 (1981). 
57 "Connectedness is increasingly recognized as an important principle within the ethical 
framework .... Stemming directly from ... feminist ... philosophical principles, the notion of 
connectedness is that decision-making and personal actions must take into consideration not 
only the decision-maker, but also other persons and events associated with the decision-maker. 
While making decisions in a detached manner may foster great objectivity and impartiality-
the hallmarks of principle-based decision-making-it can also lead to decisions and actions 
that ignore the broader impact of those actions and decisions on loved ones, family, commu-
nity, and even society at large." Greg Koski, Risks, Benefits, and Conflicts of Interest in 
Human Research: Ethical Evolution in the Changing World of Science, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
330, 331 (2000). 
58 See generally Lahey & Salter, supra note 27. See also Cohen, supra note 27, at 6; 
Paetzold, supra note 27. More recently, the new Socio-Economics movement has adopted 
similar goals and some feminist writers in business law have joined forces there. Law and 
economics scholars with a more politically liberal approach than the traditional Chicago 
School perspective have also participated. See generally Symposium, Teaching Law & 
Socioeconomics, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REv. I (2004), with contributions by June Carbone, Robert 
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a society so constructed will provide a richer and more supportive envi-
ronment in which all people can live more satisfactory lives. 
III. ETHICS IN THE DECISION PROCESS OF BUSINESS 
Given the hopes of many feminist writers-that the compassionate 
insight of the feminist perspective be included in the core of society's 
values-it is not surprising that some of those scholars have turned their 
attention to an essential dimension of our society: the business environ-
ment. One critical aspect which authors focus on is the harm that enter-
prise conduct inflicts. The feminist critiques of these harms ask why 
decision-makers make the choices they do and why the legal and politi-
cal system permits and even often supports them doing so. Primary at-
tention is given to the standpoint of the decision-makers themselves and 
what in the business environment induces these individuals to elect activ-
ities that produce such levels of harm. At the heart of feminist analyses 
is the belief that the willingness to undertake activities which can have 
dire consequences for some stems from the absence of the ethic of care 
in the foundation of business law and policy structure. 59 The question 
feminists then ask is: why is that true and what might remedy it? 
A. DILUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY 
The nucleus of the business enterprise consists of a decision process 
that is fragmented, in which the recipients of the benefits or the sufferers 
of the consequences of enterprise activity are distinct from those who set 
enterprise policy. As a result, management, whose efforts aim to maxi-
mize profits, do not themselves bear a personal relationship with the out-
come.60 The benefits of management's actions accrue to the owners, 
usually shareholders, who typically select the managers but who gener-
ally do not participate directly in enterprise decisions or know the origins 
of their benefits. The harmful consequences of enterprise conduct, how-
ever, fall by and large on entirely different individuals or groups who 
have little or no say regarding business decisions: consumers, employees, 
and neighbors to the physical location of the enterprise, all suffering 
Ashford, Lynne Dallas, Thomas Vlen, Edward Rubin, Jeffrey Stake, Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, 
Ellen Dannin, Timothy Canova, Claire More Dickerson, Katherine Stone, Margaret Brining, 
Richard Gershon, Charles Pouncy, Willima Black, and Jeffrey Harrison. 
59 For example, refer to the work by Kathleen A. Lahey, Sarah W. Salter, Ronnie Co-
hen, Ramona L. Paetzold, June Carbone, Lynne Dallas, Ellen Dannin, Claire More Dickerson, 
Katherine Stone, Margaret Brining, and WiIlima Black, supra note 58. 
60 It is important to make a distinction between corporate management decisions regard-
ing the company for personal gain at the expense of others, such as the criminal activity of 
those indicted in the Enron scandal and decisions made for corporate gain. For an excellent 
description and analysis of the theoretical and legal implication of Enron's downfall, see Ma-
cey, supra note 14. 
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from the toxic effects of the production process. Even today, as holding 
one's life-time savings in stock is more feasible among a broader cross 
section of society, a demarcation has emerged between the few share-
holders who are corporate insiders with ties close to management and the 
remaining "outsider" shareholders, where the former influence business 
decisions to their own benefit leaving the latter to suffer the fallout. 
The resulting fragmentation in the decision process induces each of 
the decision-making groups to focus myopically on their own relatively 
narrow goals. The shareholders focus on their dividends and the growth 
of their shares' market value. The managers, whose compensation and 
continued position are determined by the company's performance, focus 
on maximizing profits to generate those large dividends and induce in-
creased shareholder value. The recipients of the harmful fallout-the 
consumers, the employees, the enterprise's neighbors, and on occasion, 
the outsider shareholders-for the most part do not participate in the de-
cision process.61 Thus, nothing inherent in the decision structure insists 
on including a full awareness of the potential harmful effects on the 
"others." It is not difficult, therefore, for the shareholders and the man-
agers, each concerned with their own narrow aspect of the business' 
functioning to shut their eyes to the larger, more global impact of enter-
prise undertakings. 
Furthermore, the consumers, employees and neighbors are fairly 
powerless to affect these decisions that will ultimately affect them. Ad-
mittedly labor unions, environmental collectives and such have afforded 
some groups a measure of protection, but most members of society are at 
the mercy of the business decision process.62 For the most part, people 
do not even know the course of actions chosen or the potential harm to 
which they are put at risk until after consequences have occurred.63 
Even then, the primary avenue of recourse open is to seek remedies after 
the fact through lawsuits, a recourse fraught with hurdles and barriers. 
61 For a general deSCription of the functioning of a corporation, see ROBERT HAMILTON 
& JONATHAN MACEY, CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 2003). With regard to the conduct of corporate 
insider shareholders to the disadvantage of outsider shareholders, see supra note 60. 
62 Some European countries require that unions and representatives of constituencies 
other than those of the shareholders be on the board of directors for these reasons. See, e.g., 
Larry Fauver & Michael Fuerst, Does Good Corporate Governance Include Employee Repre-
sentation? Evidence from Gennan Corporate Boards (2004) (University of Miami) (on file 
with author) (empirical analysis demonstrating that presence of labor on Boards increases finn 
value and improves corporate governance). 
63 This was most notably apparent in the Enron scandal, when employees aligned them-
selves with shareholder interests by investing in Enron shares, and yet still victimized by the 
corporate insider shareholders. See supra notes 14 and 60. 
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B. THE BUSINESS COST-BENEFIT PROCESS, THE MORALS OF THE 
MARKETPLACE, AND THE CRITICS 
The impact of business decisions suggest an inherent inadequacy in 
the consideration of the harm to victims when evaluating the gains to the 
beneficiaries. A feminist approach would strive to integrate the harm's 
proper weight and see as essential to that end imbuing the decision envi-
ronment with the ethic of care.64 It is useful, however, to consider first 
the law and economics' assessment of the firm's decision-process and its 
capacity to yield outcomes that mirror society's values. Hopefully, the 
law and economics framework can facilitate the goals of a feminist 
approach. 
As many law and economic scholars have long asserted, the most 
common and effective technique to evaluate decisions is cost-benefit 
analysis, which assesses the costs and the benefits of any particular un-
dertaking from the perspective of the decision-maker. From the firm's 
point of view, in seeking to maximize its profits, this evaluation of any 
particular venture is based on what revenues the firm expects to receive 
(the benefits) and what expenses it anticipates incurring (the costs). By 
comparison, a cost-benefit analysis engaged in by a social policy-maker 
for the purpose of maximizing society's welfare may not appraise factors 
in the same way as the firm, even if using the same process to make the 
decision. In order to compare meaningfully the firm's optimal decision 
with regard to risk with that of society's, it is important to understand the 
components of the firm's cost-benefit evaluation. 
Included in the firm's assessment of benefits and costs is a consider-
ation of the risks and uncertainties in both factors: the variability in both 
the potential revenue and the potential expenses. The management's ap-
praisal of the impact of uncertainty in these elements is based on the 
firm's experience and its assessment of future possible outcomes. As 
demonstrated in other contexts,65 the most effective method Df appraising 
the uncertainties in these factors is to weight each potential revenue or 
cost by its probability of occurring. In the simplest of cases this means 
to multiply each potential revenue stream by its probability of occurring 
and then sum those results and multiply each potential cost by its 
probability of occurring and sum those results. These calculations gener-
ate an "expected" revenue and an "expected" cost, though it is "ex-
pected" in a mathematical sense not in a literal sense.66 
64 See supra note 59. 
65 See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic 
Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 877-87 (1998). 
66 Suppose, for a simple example, the reader joins a game of coin toss. The rules are: if 
the coin turns up heads the reader receives $5.00, if the coin shows up tails the reader receives 
nothing. Assuming a "fair" coin (one which comes up heads 'h the time and tails 'h of the 
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The decision process involves weighing the sum of the "expected" 
benefits against the sum of the "expected" costs or, from the firm's point 
of view, the expected revenues against the expected expenses.67 If the 
expected revenues exceed the expected expenses then the venture is 
worth risking undertaking as it is more likely to prove profitable than 
not. If there is more than one potentially profitable venture under con-
sideration, the firm will undertake the most likely profitable first and 
continue to select business ventures in the rank-order of their expected 
profitability, limited by the firm's available resources.68 In this manner, 
the firm uses cost-benefit analysis to maximize its profits, given its 
resources. 
One core law and economics assertion is that the firm's cost-benefit 
process to maximize its profits generates choices that are also maximally 
beneficial for society as wel1.69 Underlying that conclusion, however, is 
an implicit assumption that the criteria the firm uses to evaluate its costs 
and benefits are effectively equivalent to those society would choose in 
the same situation.70 That is debatable, particularly regarding what con-
stitutes acceptable risks and allocations of harm. 
time}, then on average, the reader can expect to receive $5.00 half the time and expect to 
receive nothing half the time. The literal use of expectation in the previous sentence is not 
what is meant by the mathematical sense of "expectation." The mathematical expectation is 
calculated by multiplying each possible revenue by its probability of occurring and then sum-
ming the results. So in this instance, the mathematical "expected revenue" is: $5.00 x 'h + $0 
x 'h = $2.50 + $0 = $2.50. Thus the managers would evaluate this "revenue" situation as 
having an "expected revenue" of $2.50 even though $2.50 is in fact never paid out. The reader 
only can receive either $5.00 or $0 but, over time and repeated plays of the game, what the 
reader receives averages out to $2.50, the "expected revenue" (or "expected benefit" in more 
general terms). 
The mathematical expectation is equivalent or equal to what the reader would receive on 
average per game over time if he or she played the game repeatedly. However, the mathemati-
cal expectation is an equally valid notion even if the reader plays the game just once (or the 
firm undertakes the venture just once). This is because the mathematical expectation is the 
"mean" or averaging of all the possible outcomes. Thus the "expected revenue" (or expected 
benefit) is the average of the possible outcome weighed by their probabilities of occurring. 
67 Once again, as in supra note 66, the expected cost is calculated by multiplying each of 
the potential costs by their probability of occurring and summing the result. 
68 For readers more sophisticated in this kind of analysis, it should be clear that I am 
assuming risk-neutrality for ease of exposition-an assumption that is quite customary in such 
discussions as well as one that is quite reasonable in general as well as here. 
69 The origins of this argument come from the original "invisible hand" theory of Adam 
Smith. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS (Edwin Cannan ed., Modem Library 1937) (l776); ADAM SMITH AND THE PHILOSO-
PHY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Robin Paul Malloy & Jerry Evensky eds., 1994). 
70 In particular, the Chicago School has often argued that the value of the costs and 
benefits to the firm are dictated by market prices and market prices efficiently reflect the 
relative preferences in society as a whole. That market prices adequately and accurately re-
flect social preferences is an often-criticized conclusion and the economics literature is replete 
with articles demonstrating how and when market prices fail to do so. Though market prices 
are a good indicator of consumer choices under a narrow range of circumstances, they are very 
heavily influenced by society's income distribution skewing preferences towards the wealthy. 
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Two arguments should be mentioned, however, that suggest that the 
fIrm's use of market prices in its cost-benefIt calculations leads to deci-
sions that also reflect society's preferences with regard to the particular 
venture. One argument points to the social values reflected in prices of 
goods and services because the market responds to consumers' prefer-
ences for particular products through the market's pricing mechanism. If 
consumers demand more of a good, its price tends to rise, stimulating 
producers to increase its supply; if a product falls into disfavor, its price 
will fall as well, causing producers to supply less. As long as consumer 
desires are strong enough to keep a good's market price above the cost of 
producing it, thereby allowing suppliers to make a profit, suppliers will 
keep supplying as much as is wanted by the consumers who are willing 
to pay for it. Thus the market effIciently reflects consumers' (and there-
fore society's) collective preference for goods by allocating productive 
resources to meet those needs and desires in the most effective way. In 
addition, the prices established in the market place reflect in a democratic 
fashion (that is, by consumers "voting" with their dollars) to what extent 
members of society value goods relative to their costs and relative to 
other possible goods. When a fIrm uses those market prices to evaluate 
the profItability of a venture, it uses a proxy of what society's evaluation 
would be of the venture's costs and benefIts. Though the fIrm's eye is on 
its own profIts, its calculations employ the market price evaluations a 
social policy-maker might elect to reflect community choices to assess 
any particular venture from society's vantage point. 71 
The second argument follows from the fIrst and that is the threat of 
post hoc legal accountability adequately deters corporate decision-mak-
ers a priori from making socially unpalatable choices.72 The deterrence 
argument reasons that since successful lawsuits lead to monetary judg-
ments, businesses must consider possible profIt reductions due to liabili-
ties from any harmful fallout in the efforts to maximize profIts. 
Therefore some ventures, which might be the most profItable without 
liability attaching, will prove less attractive when potential liabilities are 
Furthermore, market pricing does not address a broad range of circumstances when the market 
mechanism fails altogether (the private market's incapacity to provide national military de-
fense is one most notable example) and it does not adequately respond to long range larger 
social decisions that need to be addressed at policy levels. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & 
THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS ch. I, 2 (4th ed. 2004). 
71 See infra note 73. 
72 There are a number of sources that a reader can turn to for more extensive, complex 
aspects of the deterrence theory approach as well as criticisms of it. The classic text is RICH-
ARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (6th ed. 2003). The reader is also referred to 
STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2004) and AVERY WIENER 
KATZ, FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC ApPROACH TO LAW (1998), which includes a number 
of well-known articles both extolling and critiquing the conclusions made by the analysis 
presented here. 
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considered. Thus management will choose to forgo those ventures that 
are too risky or, in the alternative, they may choose to invest in efforts to 
reduce risk levels to maintain the venture's profitability. 
Even in the instances when the marketplace gives no measure of 
harm, the firm is still forced to contend with a social evaluation of the 
harm's costs. For example, in instances of pain and suffering for which 
there is no market price beyond medical and therapeutic costs, jury judg-
ments are an independent body's assessment of the monetary value of the 
harm. Since juries consist of members of the community, their decisions 
reflect a social evaluation. Thus, to gauge accurately what financial risks 
it is undertaking, a firm must consider the social perspectives of the ben-
efits and costs, whether through market prices or some other community 
monetary assessments of harm. Therefore, deterrence theory concludes, 
the firm's private choice on risk in the end reflects society'S public 
choice on risk. The conclusion thus is that firms responding to market 
forces as well as lawsuit threats will lead firms inexorably to optimal 
social welfare decisions, as society would define them.73 
Critics of law and economics' commendation of the cost-benefit 
process often view the analyses as an intolerable justification of infliction 
of harm. Representatives of an entity make decisions that put not them-
selves but others at risk74 with business profits and not social well-being 
in mind.75 Such decisions are innately suspicious as to their advantage 
for society as a whole. The response of the traditional law and economics 
approach is: that is the appeal of the marketplace evaluation-its inher-
ent neutrality. Market prices, jury judgments, are not established by the 
firm, they are established by members of the community on the basis of 
what they think is worthwhile. The fact that the firm's decision-makers 
keep focused on the financial bottom line impels them to use the commu-
nity's evaluation of the benefits and harm. From the endpoint view of 
society, it should matter not who makes these life and death cost-benefit 
decisions; what matters is that the decisions comport with society's val-
73 Two seminal works that address the correspondence between the firm's decision to 
undenake risk and what the social norm is or should be are: WILLIAM M. LANDES AND RICH· 
ARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987) and STEVEN SHAVELL, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987). 
74 Gabaldon, supra note 27, at 1425-27. Though not identified as feminist analysis, the 
critique of cost-benefit decision-making in Lisa Heinzerling's The Rights of Statistical People, 
24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 189 (2000) is quite sympathetic to the values of feminist thought. 
75 For an excellent analysis of how the concept of firms using the cost-benefit approach 
to determine whether it is more profitable to violate legal sanctions and risk paying penalties is 
disruptive to the sense of corporate responsibility to obey laws as a good citizen, see Cynthia 
A. Williams, Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. REv. 
1265 (1998). Some of these concerns are addressed later when examining applications of 
feminist technique to moderate the corporate decision process. See infra text accompanying 
notes \90-220. 
24 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 15:1 
ues and approximate them as efficiently and cleanly as possible. This is 
the debate that lies most uneasily at the center of the conflict between the 
marketplace advocates regarding business decisions and those who es-
chew it. 
Much feminist criticism of traditional law and economic evaluations 
indict the cost-benefit decision process itself along with the methods 
used for evaluating benefits and harms. They are not alone in doing so.76 
In some instances, the cost-benefit reasoning process and the evaluation 
of its elements have been so intertwined in scholars' minds that the pro-
cess and the evaluation often have been condemned or applauded sum-
marily without distinguishing between the two. In other instances, it is 
the bringing of the cost-benefit approach itself to decisions that assess 
whether or not to risk people's lives that brings censure.77 
Clearly, though, avoiding all harm at any cost is not feasible nor is 
going to any lengths in an effort to do so likely to reflect a collective 
choice of society's members. A risk-free path is as unavailable to soci-
ety's life as it is to the business enterprise or an individual.78 Effective 
community decisions as to which risks to endure must employ some 
form of weighing and balancing, explicitly or implicitly, to reach socially 
preferred directions even at the risk of harm, though the goal is to seek 
social well-being and not enterprise welfare.79 What distinguishes the 
social decision from the enterprise decision is not the process but the 
evaluation of the risks and benefits. Social choices stem from social con-
cerns and different situations excite different social sensibilities.80 
Firms' cost-benefit decisions are, by and large, market-price driven. 
76 See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, The Grounds of Welfare, 112 YALE L. J. 1511 (2003). 
77 See generally, McCluskey, supra note 30. 
78 For a recent analysis of how our decisions regarding risk have transformed, see Jason 
Scott Johnston, Paradoxes of the Safe Society: A Rational Actor Approach to the Reconceptu-
alization of Risk and the Reformation of Risk Regulation, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 747 (2003). 
79 Robert Frank gives an interesting example of the trade-offs between social benefits 
and costs when he has the reader consider a technology that "would reduce the cost of [energy] 
by half ... [and] its only negative effect were to degrade our view of the Grand Canyon for 
just one IS-second interval each decade" and compares it with a technology "that produced 
only a negligible reduction in the cost of [energy] at the expense of a dark cloud that continu-
ously shielded North America from the rays of the Sun." Robert H. Frank, Why is Cost-Benefit 
Analysis so Controversial? 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 913, 914 (2000). He goes on to say, "[w]e live 
in a continuous world. If the first technology is clearly acceptable, and the second clearly 
unacceptable, some intermediate technology is neither better nor worse than the status quo." 
[d. He, of course, acknowledges that some people might object to any degrading of the Grand 
Canyon view, in particular because of their concerns for the "slippery slope" problem. [d. at 
914 n.2. 
80 For example, consider the efforts expended to save Baby Jessica from a dire end as a 
result of falling into a well in Midland, Texas in 1987 including the donations accumulating to 
millions of dollars for a trust fund for her, see Mark Badineck, Baby Jessica's Family Stays 
La-Key Ten Years After Water Well Drama, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 14, 1997, compared to 
decisions not to add the $1100-$1600 costs for seatbelts for children in school buses costing 
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Cost-benefit reasoning has a wide range of meanings depending on 
the context in which it is being used. In law and economics, historically, 
it has been mostly identified with the Kaldor-Hicks definition of effi-
ciency, one which has certain implicit value judgments on the weighting 
of individuals relative to each other and often by using market prices and 
current income distribution for that evaluation.8 ) Even within the frame-
work of economic analysis, however, one can find flaws in the process 
that would not comport with a societal evaluation of welfare. For exam-
ple, economists have long observed that the use of market prices skew 
the measures of social welfare in favor of the preferences of those at the 
higher end of the income distribution.82 There are a number of social 
concerns that do not get captured by market prices, for example, the con-
sequence of environmental pollution and other toxic harms.83 Another 
concern is the marketplace's inability to induce production of socially 
desirable goods and services because of lack of profitability, such as fun-
damental scientific research, or the inability to collect revenue, for exam-
ple, to provide national defense.84 Conceptually, however, assessments 
of costs and benefits of choices can consider as broad a range of con-
cerns as seems relevant, beyond merely market goods and income, al-
lowing the weighing and balancing of all factors deemed important by 
the decision-maker. 
The real question is not whether decisions on risking people's wel-
fare can be avoided-they cannot-but whether they can be made in a 
manner that bears the ethics and morals of the society in which they take 
place. It is in addressing this issue that feminist analysis of business 
conduct and its legal framework can provide the most useful insight. 
$40,000-$70,000 even though II children die in school bus accidents every year, see National 
Highway Traffic Safety Adminstration, research infonnation, Seatbelts on School Buses, at 
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injurylbuses/pub/seatbelt.hmp.html(lastvisitedFeb.15. 
2006); Dr. Alan Ross, Testimony of the President of the National Coalition for School Bus 
Saftey, at http://www.ncsbs.orgltestimonies/testimony_aross.htrn(lastvisitedFeb.15. 2006) 
(It is still heavily debated, because of lack of data, as to what extent seatbelts in school buses 
would reduce the number of deaths and it is argued that the cost of the seat belts might be 
better spent in other safety programs). 
8) See discussion infra text accompanying notes 103-07. 
82 For an analysis of this issue and its ramifications with examples, see Matthew D. 
Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L. J. 165, 181-191 
(1999). 
83 For an excellent up-to-date discussion of these issues as well as presenting from an-
other perspective a multi-disciplinary approach to the law and economic treatment of environ-
mental harms, see Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 Nw. V.L. REv. 675 
(2003). The classic articles on this topic are A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th 
ed. 1932) and the well-known criticism of it, R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. 
& EcON. I (1960). 
84 More detailed as well as accessible descriptions and analysis of the drawbacks of 
relying solely on the markets can be found in COOTER & ULEN, supra note 70. 
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IV. (LAW AND) ECONOMIC EFFORTS TO IMPROVE COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
Recent literature in the law and economic arena emphasizes the 
need to improve the evaluation process of cost-benefit reasoning. The 
focus has been primarily on governmental agencies' decision process. 
These efforts are likely prompted by the fact that across the political 
spectrum, Presidential executive orders have mandated that regulatory 
agencies use cost-benefit reasoning in the agency's decision process.85 
Furthermore, courts have increasingly approved or required the use of 
cost-benefit analysis;86 indeed one might argue that courts have been 
adopting the use of cost-benefit reasoning for the better part of a century, 
whether explicitly or implicitly.87 There also has been an increasing 
awareness, with rapidly changing technology, that choices have to be 
made on a more ex ante basis as to what course to take and with greater 
rapidity. This requires evaluating deftly the potential consequences of 
each possible direction. Engaging in cost-benefit analysis for each of 
these decisions is inevitable, on the individual level, in the private mar-
ket, and at the governmentallevel.88 Though most of the recent exami-
nations have focused on improving the government's use of cost-benefit 
analysis, the issues they raise and the analyses they offer can extend to 
85 See Robert W. Hahn & Mary Beth Muething, The Grand Experiment in Regulatory 
Reporting, 55 ADMIN L. REV. 607 (2003). 
86 Robert H. Frank & Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position, 68 
U. CHI. L. REv. 323, 323-24 (2001). 
87 See Barbara Ann White, Risk-Utility Analysis and the Learned Hand Formula: A 
Hand that Helps or a Hand that Hides?, 32 ARlz. L. REv. 77, 96-102 (1990) (suggesting 
Cardozo as one of the first jurists to consistently use an implicit cost-benefit approach for 
judicial decision-making). 
88 For examples of cost-benefit's expansion in government policy, see, e.g., Cindy 
Skrzycki, OMB Proposes Changes in Federal Rulemaking: Agencies Would be Required to do 
More Analysis of Risks, Costs, and Benefits, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2003, at A07. Twenty-five 
years ago, courts were conflicted as to the use of cost-benefit reasoning in the private sector. 
Compare Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. (The Pinto case), 119 Cal. App.3d 757, 813 (1981) 
("There was evidence that Ford could have corrected the hazardous design defects at minimal 
cost but decided to defer correction of the shortcomings by engaging in a cost-benefit analysis 
balancing human lives and limbs against corporate profits") with United States Fid. & Guar. 
Co. v. Plovidba, 683 F.2d 1022, 1026 (7th Cir. 1982) ("[T]he formula is a valuable aid to clear 
thinking about the factors that are relevant to a judgment of negligence and about the relation-
ship among those factors"). Today, courts more often acknowledge cost-benefit's role in the 
corporate decision process. See, e.g., Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 
548 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion for not recognizing the cost-
benefit incentives for the firms who are parties in the case). Also, Corporate Finance, typically 
a required core course for an MBA degree, teaches the most effective techniques of cost-
benefit decision-making in private enterprise. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. 
MEYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE (7th ed. 2003). Business-oriented law students 
must also become familiar with these more complex principles of private enterprise decision-
making. See, e.g., WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS (5th 
ed.2003). 
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cost-benefit reasoning in general and in particular to private market 
evaluations. 
A. INDETERMINACY WITHIN ECONOMIC REASONING 
The social goal of using cost-benefit analysis, however imple-
mented, is to make choices that comport with social values and improve 
social welfare. This social decision-making process, however, directly 
confronts an inherent ambiguity that lies in choosing what social values 
to enhance; this ambiguity can be characterized as an indeterminacy 
problem.89 Each of the articles over the last half decade or so that have 
addressed the cost-benefit reasoning process, or the more encompassing 
question of how to determine enhancements to social welfare overall, 
have sought to remove the inherent ambiguity. These scholarly efforts 
look to improve upon the dissatisfactions of the strictly market price 
evaluation approach, which is one way to remove the inherent indetermi-
nacy, but yields results drawing the criticisms discussed in Part 1. The 
more recent considerations seek to discover superior methodologies to 
determine what is unambiguously socially preferred when weighing indi-
vidual preferences and community moral values. Although their efforts 
narrow the range of indeterminacy that requires subjective evaluation by 
the decision-maker, they do not eliminate it. 
1. Origins of Indeterminacy and its Circumscription (though not 
elimination) Through Pareto Analysis 
At the core of the inherent ambiguity in social decision-making are 
questions of interpersonal comparisons as well as determinations of our 
moral social values in order to render an evaluation of what constitutes 
enhancements of our social welfare. The issues raised by these questions 
become clearer by first examining the analysis that most scholars in the 
area agree define unambiguous improvements in society's well-being but 
is one that is also limited in scope. The usual starting point is the Pareto 
Principle, which simply put, states an unambiguous improvement to soci-
ety's well-being occurs if a venture (for example, producing a good or 
89 The choice here of the tenn indeterminacy is deliberate though not the one commonly 
used in law and economics (or in economics). A more typical economic characterization is to 
state that economic analysis does not give a complete ordering to all the available choices. 
See, e.g., Adler & Posner, supra note 82, at 188. However, "indetenninacy' is a concept more 
familiar in the legal framework, earlier with the legal realists and more recently with critical 
legal studies. See Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 283 (1989); see also 
John Hasnas, Back to the Future: From Critical Legal Studies Forward to Legal Realism, or 
How Not to Miss the Point of the Indeterminacy Argument, 45 DUKE L. J. 84 (1995). But the 
use of the tenn here is appropriate because, as we shall see, the indetenninacy revealed by 
economic analysis of cost-benefit reasoning is in nexus with the indetenninacy with which 
critical legal studies scholars and other authors are concerned. See infra note 99. 
28 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 15:1 
service either privately or publicly) makes at least one person better off 
while making no one else worse off.90 As long as this is strictly true (for 
example, no "hidden" or unstated costs), the consensus is that there is an 
unarguable gain to society if the venture is undertaken. Note that inter-
personal comparisons are not involved or necessary here. Undertaking 
such a venture is referred to as a Pareto Superior action. 
A related concept is the state of Pareto Optimality, which is reached 
when it is no longer possible to undertake any additional venture that will 
make someone better off without making at least one other person worse 
off. Often the terms "economic efficiency" and "economically efficient" 
are used as substitutes for Pareto Optimality or Pareto Superior, though 
"economic efficiency" and "economically efficient" are also used to 
cover a broader range of concepts of social improvement. In addition, 
one may conceptualize Pareto analysis to address more intangible issues 
such as the distribution of property rights or more abstract notions of 
legal rights, but for ease of exposition, goods and services will be used 
here.91 
In the first quarter century of the influx of law and economics rea-
soning into legal analysis,92 a majority of the relevant literature advo-
cated undertaking Pareto improvements. In particular, law and 
economics scholars drew on the fact that economists had shown that free 
markets, left unfettered and with no impediments, tended to reach Pareto 
Optimality-that is, a distribution of goods and services from which no 
Pareto Superior improvements could be made. This was one of the intel-
lectual underpinnings of the wealth-maximization principle, recom-
mended to guide legal decisions, that was pervasive throughout the 
literature at that time. This observation also motivated the use of market 
prices to evaluate costs and benefits described earlier. 93 It was believed 
that the prices established by the market reflected people's evaluation of 
goods and services and therefore constituted a good choice to measure 
society's evaluation of costs and benefits. 
The stumbling block of Pareto analysis is that within any given so-
ciety there are a multitude of Pareto Optimal allocations of goods and 
services.94 Furthermore, there is no unambiguous way of choosing 
90 The Pareto Principle has been the hallmark of economic efficiency analysis for nearly 
a century. See Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Domain of Preference, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 717, 730-
31 (2003). 
91 For a discussion of distribution and distributional impacts of decisions, whether they 
be public or private enterprise decisions, see infra text accompanying notes 126-30. 
92 Modem law and economic approaches to legal problems is usually dated as starting 
with the publication of Ronald H. Coase's The Problem of Social Cost. 
93 See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. 
94 The observation that (in a hypothetical two person world) there could be one Pareto 
Optimal allocation of goods that one person prefers while the second person prefers another is 
known as the Scitovsky Paradox. See T. De Scitovsky, A Note on Welfare Propositions in 
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which among those Pareto Optimal allocations is the "best one," at least 
not by any Paretian criteria. This is because, as we see in the graphs in 
the footnotes below, each Pareto Optimal point is associated with a dif-
ferent distribution of goods and services among society's members, or 
more generally a different distribution of income (or even more ab-
stractly, different distributions of rights). To pick one particular Pareto 
Optimal point is also making a decision as to a particular distribution of 
income (or who should have what), which is strictly a deontological 
choice. There is no unambiguous way of choosing one distribution as 
better or superior from an efficiency standpoint. Of necessity, moving 
from one Pareto Optimal income distribution to another Pareto Optimal 
income distribution means that someone will be made worse off while 
someone else will be made better off. Thus, moving from one Pareto 
Optimal point to another Pareto Optimal point can never be a Pareto 
Superior move and therefore cannot be justified on efficiency grounds. 
What this implies then is that an unfettered marketplace merely leads 
society to one Pareto Optimal distribution out of many, with no guaran-
tee that it is the socially preferred one. Hence, the only justification for 
moving from one Pareto Optimal point to another is an ethical considera-
tion or the application of a fairness principle or a political purpose. 
To see this, examine the following reasoning in conjunction with 
the graphical analysis in the accompanying footnotes. For simplicity, 
assume we have a society with two individuals: Ann and Bill, and there 
are only two goods to consume: food and gas and a finite amount of 
each, 100 pounds of food and 200 gallons of gas, that can be distributed 
between Ann and Bill. Each individual derives different levels of satis-
faction from consuming various quantities of each of the goods. Further-
more, each is willing to have less of one good if compensated with 
sufficiently more of the other good so as to be as satisfied as before. The 
rate at which Ann is willing to exchange food for gas is likely to be 
different than the rate Bill is, because they are likely to have different 
preferences regarding the two goods. What is true however (or so we 
assume), Ann and Bill each will feel more satisfied if given more of one 
good while still having the same amount of the other good.95 In other 
words, more is always preferred to less, regardless of the individual pref-
Economics, 9 REv. EcON. STUD. 77 (1941). A number of numerical demonstrations of the 
paradox exist in legal literature. A recent one is in Adler & Posner, supra note 82, at 184-86. 
95 The graphical exposition is as follows. There are two individuals, Ann and Bill; two 
goods, food and (heating) gas; and a finite quantity of each commodity, e.g., 100 pounds of 
food and 200 gallons of gas. Assume that there are various levels of satisfaction Ann and Bill 
each derive from different quantities of consumption. Also, assume that any given level of 
satisfaction can be achieved from differing combinations of quantities of food and gas. This is 
based on the assumption that there is always some rate at which each individual is willing to 
substitute a portion of one commodity for a portion of the other and be indifferent between the 
choice of consuming the combination after the exchange or consuming the one prior to it. 
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erences of Ann and Bill. In the meantime, if we allocate all of the availa-
ble food and gas between Ann and Bill, and at least one of them would 
prefer a somewhat different allocation and the other is indifferent, if not 
also preferring a somewhat different allocation, then they will trade-
assuming they are free to trade with each other. They will trade food and 
gas with each other until they reach a point where further trading can no 
longer make at least one of them better off without making the other 
worse off. 
For example, say that Ann is trading away to Bill pounds of food in 
exchange for gallons of gas. This means that Ann prefers the amount of 
gas she is receiving to the amount of food she is giving up and vice versa 
By portraying a particular level of satisfaction with an analytic concept called an "indif-
ference curve" in economics, the combinations of quantities of meat and potatoes that give the 
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The curves labeled I, are each, respectively, Ann and Bill's indifference curves. Points I 
and 2 on Ann's curve represent two different combinations of food and gas that give Ann 
equal levels of satisfaction. Any other point on the curve also represents a combination that 
gives her the same level of satisfaction. Similarly, points I and 2 on Bill's indifference curve 
give him the same level of satisfaction, and so forth. Any point above and to the right of 
Ann's I, curve represents a combination of goods that gives Ann a greater level of satisfaction 
than any point on Ann's I, curve. In a parallel fashion, any point below and to the left of 
Ann's I, curve represents a combination of goods that gives Ann a lower level of satisfaction. 
Due to the assumption of substitutability of one good for another, we know that for each 
combination of goods, there are other combinations that also yield equivalent levels of satis-
faction. Therefore, if a particular combination is not part of I" then it is part of some other 
indifference curve. An example of a combination yielding satisfaction greater than I, is de-
picted on Ann's graph as point 3 and the indifference curve with which it is associated is 
drawn on Figure I using dashes. An example of a combination yielding less than I, is depicted 
on Bill's graph as point 4 with its associated indifference curves for each individual, and that 
between any two indifference curves there always lies a third that can be depicted if one 
chooses to do so. The collection of indifference curves for each individual is referred to as that 
individual's "indifference map" and reflects that individual's tastes and preferences for food 
relative to gas at different levels of consumption. 
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for Bill. Once the two traders reach an allocation in which Ann is no 
longer willing to give up one more pound of food for the amount that 
Bill, at this point, is willing to give back in gas, they have reached a 
Pareto Optimal point or a Pareto allocation of goods. It is not possible to 
improve either party's well-being by transferring between them any 
amount of food or gas without making the other worse off. Each values 
more highly the next unit of the good they would need to give up than 
the quantity of the other good they would receive in exchange.96 
96 We can create a picture of this "economy" by having Ann and Bill "face" each other 
through their respective indifference curves within the framework of a box that represents all 
the goods available for the two to consume. This is accomplished by "flipping" one of the 
individual's indifference map, Bill's in this case, to face the other . 








The dimensions of the box represent the entire quantities of goods available for consump-
tion by the two individuals; the width of the box represents 200 gallons of gas and the height 
of the box represents 100 pounds of food. The construction of the box in this fashion is such 
that any point in or on the box represents a complete distribution between Ann and Bill of all 
the food and gas available for consumption. For example, point F on the box represents the 
allocation where Ann is endowed with all the available food and no gas and Bill is endowed 
with all the available gas and no food. Point G, on the other hand, allocates all the food to Bill 
and all the gas to Ann. Thus, once an allocation is made (i.e., a point in or on the box is 
selected) the only way Ann or Bill can improve their respective lots (short of one expropriating 
goods from the other) is to trade with each other. Trading with each other will only improve 
their lots if their preferences, given their endowments, are such that each is willing to give up 
some of what the other prefers in exchange for what the other prefers to give up. 
Some potential gains from trade can be more rigorously explained through the following 
analysis in the graph above. Let E represent an initial endowment (arbitrarily chosen) for Ann 
and Bill, when Bill's initial endowment is Ba gallons of gas and BFPounds of food, and Ann's 
is Aa gallons and AF pounds. From their respective endowments Ann and Bill each derive 
their own level of satisfaction, which is reflected in their respective indifference curves associ-
ated with their endowments. These indifference curves are labeled IA (for Ann) and Is (for 
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However, even with the initial distribution of goods (as long as it 
was not coincidentally Pareto Optimal), the allocation of food and gas 
Ann and Bill each will have after trading is not uniquely determined. 
There are an infinite number of possible allocations they may bargain to, 
as long as at least one ends up at a higher level of satisfaction and the 
other is no worse off than the start.97 The state they will end up in their 
negotiations depends on their relative bargaining skills. We only know 
for certain that at least one of them (and probably both) will be better off 
in terms of satisfaction after trading. We also know they will reach one 
of the possible Pareto Optimal points. Furthermore, each Pareto Optimal 
point is associated with a different allocation of food and gas between 
Ann and Bill. In other words, each Pareto Optimal point is associated 
with a different distribution of goods (or, more abstractly, rights) be-
tween Ann and Bill. 
Finally, not only is there an infinite number of Pareto Optimal allo-
cations that can be reached from a given (Pareto Inferior, or non-Pareto 
Optimal) initial allocation of goods, there are also an infinite number of 
Pareto Optimal allocations associated with any possible initial (Pareto 
Inferior) allocation of goods. Overall, within this two-person economy, 
there are an infinite number of Pareto Optimal allocations for the given 
Bill). Each can improve his or her lot by moving to a higher indifference curve, and the arrow 
on each current indifference curve indicates the direction of increase for that individual. Any 
point inside the intersection of the two initial indifference curves represents an allocation that 
puts both Ann and Bill at higher levels of satisfaction, i.e., at higher indifference curves. For 
example, point H is such a point, where the associated indifference curves have been partially 
drawn. Since H is a point in the box, it is a feasible allocation and therefore a possible trading 
result. Ann and Bill have an incentive to trade as long as at least one of them can improve his 
or her welfare as a result. The incentive to trade ceases once no more such additional gains 
can be made. Graphically, this occurs when Ann and Bill reach an allocation where their 
respective indifference curves do not intersect but are, instead, tangent to each other. Point C 
represents such a case, where again the indifference curves are partially drawn in. Clearly, no 
further improvements can be made through trading at point C because, unlike at point H, in 
order for one of the individuals to move to a higher curve, the other must necessarily move to a 
lower one; this is the result of the absence of trading space between the two indifference 
curves. 
97 Between any two intersecting indifference curves there are a number of tangent indif-
ference curves, thus making a number of ultimate trading outcomes possible. See. e.g., I. 
GOULD & c. FERGUSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 423-27 (5th ed. 1980). Without more infor-
mation about Ann and Bill's bargaining skills, which trading outcome actually will occur can-
not be determined in advance. One can say unequivocally, however, that whatever trading 
outcome will occur, it will lie within the intersection of the two indifference curves associated 
with the initial endowments, i.e., within the area defined by the intersection of IA and lB. 
From an economic standpoint, the initial endowment represented by E is inefficient or 
Pareto Inferior. Both Bill and Ann can each improve their well-being, at no cost to the other, 
by reallocating the commodities between themselves, which they can accomplish through trad-
ing. The movement from point E to an ultimate trading point such as C represents a Pareto 
Superior move, and C is a Pareto Optimal point. Moving from point E to point C, or any other 
point of tangency between Ann and Bill's indifference curves within the trading space is 
reaching a Pareto Optimal point. 
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amount of available goods (that is, 100 pounds of food and 200 gallons 
of gas) that might be achieved through trade and each is associated with 
a different distribution of those goods between Ann and Bill. Most im-
portantly, there is no efficiency justification to prefer one Pareto Optimal 
allocation and its associated distribution of goods (or rights) to any of the 
others. The only way to pick one has to be based on some deontological 
or fairness concerns.98 
In other words, if we were social planners and we were informed of 
the total amount of goods and services available to society, we would not 
be able to select a "best" distribution for the members of society solely 
on the basis of a "best" Pareto Optimal choice, as there is none. We 
would have to make a value choice as to which Pareto Optimal distribu-
tion we would prefer, making value decisions about satisfying some peo-
ple's preferences relative to others or weighing one person's welfare 
against another's. 
For example, one deontological choice could be to seek equality and 
define it as when most people's well-being was as equal to each other's 
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FIGURE 3 
The points of tangency portrayed above between Ann and Bill's indifference curves re-
present some of the Pareto Optimal points and the associated distribution of goods. Each point 
on the curve connecting the points of tangency between Ann and Bill represents a different 
Pareto Optimal point and attendant distribution of goods. Those who recall their days in math 
class will remember that there are an infinite number of points on the curve, and therefore an 
infinite number of Pareto Optimal allocations and distribution of this finite number of 100 
pounds of food and 200 gallons of gas. 
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old below which the lowest individual income would not be allowed to 
fall. A third deontological value might be to reject income distributions 
that might allow a few elite people to have extremely high standards of 
living while the rest of the population lives at a subsistence level. It 
would almost certainly be possible for each particular deontological stan-
dard one might adopt to find a distribution that is Pareto Optimal and 
approximates that goal-just as, in contrast, it would be possible to find 
different Pareto Optimal distributions for each of the obverse of those 
standards. For example, a Pareto Optimal distribution permitting a few 
elite people to be wealthy while the remainder of society lives at subsis-
tence standards would probably not be considered "fair" but it would 
nevertheless be still (Pareto) efficient.99 Fortunately, we are not re-
stricted to only "unfair" Pareto efficient distributions. 
All these distributions would be Pareto Optimal in that there is no 
possibility of improving one person's lot without reducing the lot of an-
other's; however, which Pareto Optimal distribution to choose would be 
based on our perceived proper order of things, our notions of justice or 
our notions of elitism. What we do know is that, regardless of our value 
choices, choosing a non-Pareto optimal choice instead of a Pareto opti-
mal choice would be a waste of resources because it would then be possi-
ble to make someone better off without making anyone else worse off 
and we have presumed that there would be no objections to that. 100 
99 It is here that one can see how the indeterminacy problem residing in the application 
of economic analysis to social choices dovetails with the indeterminacy problem in law, for 
example, as characterized by critical legal studies scholars. When critical legal studies schol-
ars raise the question of indeterminacy, they are asserting that the structure of law itself does 
not lead to inevitable unique determinations to resolve legal conflicts and that judges necessa-
rily fill in the gaps with their particular values and perspectives. " ... [I]n general, there does 
seem to be a sufficient degree of commitment [by critical legal scholars] to three propositions 
about law: that it is ... indeterminate; that it can be understood ... by paying attention to the 
context in which legal decisions are made; and that ... law is politics." Mark Tushnet, 
Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L. J. 1515, 1518 (1991). "[Critical legal 
studies] assert[s] that law is politics ... [in] that when one understands the moral, epistemolog-
ical, and empirical assumptions embedded in any particular legal claim, one will see that those 
assumptions operate in the particular setting in which the legal claim is made to advance the 
interests of some identifiable political grouping." [d. at 1517. Thus what is being called here a 
value or moral choice, critical legal studies might call a political choice. The resonance of the 
two concepts acknowledges that value and moral choices can be ignoble as well as noble. 
100 Actually, in a free-market economy with no impediments to trade, we could in fact 
pick a sub-optimal distribution and the parties would then trade among themselves until they 
reached a Pareto Optimal point, as was shown in the example with Ann and Bill, because they 
each value the other's goods they receive in trade more than the ones they give in trade. This 
observation is why the free market is often viewed as "economically efficient." 
Of course, when we are discussing allocations of more abstract rights, "trading" is often 
not possible. But it is important to remember that each Pareto Optimal distribution is "eco-
nomically efficient" in this narrow sense of not being able to make someone better off without 
it being at the expense of someone else. 
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The indetenninacy is further complicated when one is considering 
whether to undertake a new venture that would expand the economic pie. 
In those instances in which the venture yields net benefits to some people 
(i.e., making them better off) while making no one worse off, the venture 
would clearly be a Pareto Superior choice. It is possible, however, that 
there could be a competing venture, one that would make a different set 
of people better off while leaving the rest the same. This would also be a 
Pareto Superior move. If there are constraints that prevent undertaking 
both, say a limitation on available resources, another question is raised 
then: which one to choose? Obviously this also becomes a distributional 
question: whom in society is the decision-maker going to choose to bene-
fit? Pareto principles have nothing to offer on this question either. The 
decision once again must be premised on a value choice or moral criteria, 
one that involves interpersonal comparisons and extends beyond any 
question of "efficiency." 
It is important to note that the inherent indetenninacy yielded by 
economic analysis is not a question of a trade-off between economic effi-
ciency and moral, deontological considerations. It has often been held in 
both economics and law and economics literature that sometimes society 
is faced with a choice between efficiency and justice. Those outside law 
and economics have also frequently espoused this position as well. To 
the contrary, however, all the Pareto Optimal choices are equally eco-
nomically efficient as defined by the Pareto principles, but the choice 
between them is an ethical, distributional choice, and ultimately a choice 
of justice. The choice between the two possible efficient outcomes is the 
next step in the decision process of the policy-maker; it is not instead of 
choosing an economically efficient outcome. Thus we have defined a 
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further area of indeterminacy with respect to courses of action that ex-
pand the economic pie. lol 
Thus Pareto analysis does not in itself determine the "best" distribu-
tion of goods. It can eliminate many, if not most, distributions as candi-
dates but it still leaves a whole range of distributions, each of which is 
Pareto Optimal, from which, without more, it is not possible to choose 
the "best." This is the narrowest range of indeterminacy among choices 
that can be defined by economic analysis. 
101 
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Assume the decision-maker has a choice between expanding the amount of food available 
or the amount of gas but must make a choice between the two. The solid rectangle above 
represents the original available quantities of food and gas and the solid curve between Ann 
and Bill traces out all the possible Pareto Optimal points. We assume that for whatever fair-
ness issues guided the choice, society has settled on Pareto Optimal point I, with its attendant 
distribution of food and gas between Ann and Bill. The dotted extensions to the rectangle 
represent the new rectangle of available goods if the decision is to expand the amount of gas 
available (the horizontal extension to the right) or to expand the amount of food available (the 
vertical extension on top). The dotted curves connecting Ann and Bill in each case represent 
all the possible Pareto Optimal points for that expansion of that good. Though where Ann and 
Bill will be on the curve is dictated in part (though not completely - see note 98 and attendant 
text) by how the expansion of goods is distributed between them, two possibilities are demon-
strated here. IIF represents one possible Pareto Optimal outcome if the decision is to expand 
the amount of food. IIo represents one possible Pareto Optimal point if the decision is to 
expand the amount of gas. In IIF, Ann is made a little better off but Bill is made substantially 
better off. In the case of IIo Bill is made a little better off but Ann is made substantially better 
off. 
Note that whether each individual is better or worse off depends on whether a higher 
indifference curve is reached, not on the particular allocation of goods. The willingness to 
substitute one good for another and maintain the same level of satisfaction is what is reflected 
in the indifference curve. 
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The question then is whether there are other ways to narrow the 
indeterminacy even further, if not eliminate it altogether. That inquiry is 
discussed later in this artic1e. 102 
2. Indeterminacy in the Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency Criteria 
There is still a further wrinkle in choosing among various ventures. 
This is because, given the complexity of and interdependency within our 
society, a new venture usually has two facets to it. One is that the in-
crease in the pie of goods and services will be available to some and the 
other is that some or all of the costs will be borne by those who do not 
benefit. For example, building a new freeway may reduce travel time 
dramatically for those living in the suburbs to arrive to work in the urban 
center, but if the freeway's course is through a low-income neighborhood 
(as is often the case), the residents of that neighborhood will be subjected 
to increased automobile and noise pollution. Thus, even if there were no 
problem in evaluating the benefits and harms, there is the problem of 
redistribution of well-being from the residents of the neighborhood to the 
freeway drivers, regardless of whether there are broad benefits to the 
freeway drivers. In other words, this venture is not a Pareto Superior 
move; individuals are being made better off at the expense of other indi-
viduals, who are in fact being made worse off. Yet, if the benefits to the 
drivers are enormous and the costs to the intruded-upon residents are 
rather minimal, a policy-maker might feel that despite the redistribution 
effect, overall society welfare is improved sufficiently to sacrifice the 
reduction in the well-being of the low-income residents. 103 
This further wrinkle raises another question: how does one decide 
when it is "worth it" to make the sacrifice of some individuals' well-
being for the increased well-being of others? Is it merely a value choice 
on distribution-causing the decision-maker to resort to deontological 
evaluations involving interpersonal comparisons? Or is there an addi-
tional way of narrowing this range of indeterminacy, so that one can be 
confident that there is an unambiguous improvement in overall social 
well-being? In order to make decisions regarding ventures that increase 
the economic pie but also raise questions of redistribution, the Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency criteria was developed. 104 Its basic thesis is that a ven-
102 See infra text accompanying notes 155-89. 
103 This idea is not a new one. See, e.g., Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476 (1873) (holding 
defendant not liable for damage to plaintiffs land and personal property from defendant's 
accidentally exploding boiler because the benefits of technological progress outweigh any cost 
to members of society). Losee was decided long before the advent of law and economics and 
without the benefit of economic reasoning or the formality of cost-benefit analysis as it has 
evolved today. 
104 For a good analysis of the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency principle, see Adler & Posner, 
supra note 82, at 190-9\. 
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ture should be undertaken if the benefit to the recipients is sufficiently 
large that the recipients can compensate those who were harmed so that 
they are as well off as before the venture. This would seem to satisfy the 
spirit of Pareto criteria of unambiguous improvement in society's well-
being in that the venture allows some individuals to be made better off 
without making anyone else worse off (albeit through compensation).lOs 
The Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criteria was strongly advocated in the 
first few decades of the advent of law and economics. 106 More signifi-
cantly, those advocates of the use of law and economic principles in legal 
decision-making latched onto the observation, that in order to achieve the 
net gain to society overall, it was not actually necessary to compensate 
the individuals who were made worse off by the venture. The fact that 
they could be was sufficient to demonstrate a Pareto improvement. 
Whether to actually provide compensation was a (re-) distribution ques-
tion, an issue that economic analysis cannot address. Therefore law and 
economic advocates argued in favor of using the Kaldor-Hicks standard 
for decisions on ventures in order to achieve efficiency, regardless of 
whether compensation occurred. 
Apart from the fact that, to many legal scholars, not compensating 
those who were made worse off seemed like an appalling position, caus-
ing many to eschew economic reasoning altogether, it was also well 
known among economists that the Kaldor-Hicks principle biased choices 
in favor of those at the higher end of the income distribution. In part, 
this is because people who have higher incomes value a particular addi-
tion to their well-being less than poorer people do. Thus, when ventures 
are evaluated, it takes more to compensate wealthy people if they are the 
ones harmed than it does to compensate poor people. Therefore, the ben-
efit of a project has to be much greater if it is to compensate for harm 
done to the wealthy as compared with the poor. Thus, a cost-benefit 
analysis under Kaldor-Hicks criteria will skew choices in favor of 
projects in which the harms flow to the poor who, without further action, 
are also uncompensated. Though Kaldor-Hicks appeared to narrow the 
range of indeterminacy, it did so by simultaneously making implicit re-
distribution decisions but ones that redistributed in favor of the wealthy. 
Furthermore, the Kaldor-Hicks criteria did not solve the dilemma of 
choosing from among competing ventures. It merely determined which 
105 The Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion also suffered from the Scitovsky paradox in that 
it is possible in a two person economy for one person, in a move to state A, to benefit suffi-
ciently to compensate the other and vice versa for the second person in moving to state B. 
Scitovszky, supra note 94. 
106 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 72, at 3-6; Daniel A. Farber, What (If Anything) Can 
Economics Say About Equity? 101 MICH. L. REV. 1791, 1795-96 (2003); Richard A. Posner, 
The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOF-
STRA L. REv. 487 (1980). 
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ventures were efficient by its criteria, but not which one of those to 
undertake. 
B. RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO COST-BENEFIT REASONING 
The preceding section demonstrates that there are three sources of 
indeterminacy that require value choices that traditional economics or 
law and economics cannot resolve by resorting to efficiency analysis: (a) 
the choice among multiple distributions of existing goods and services 
among members of society, (b) the choice among different Pareto Supe-
rior ventures that will expand the economic pie but benefit different 
members of society, and (c) the most realistic real world situation-the 
choice as to whether and when to sacrifice the welfare of some to benefit 
others. Using market prices to make these decisions, though that is in-
deed a value choice, is not very satisfying for reasons stated earlier. 
How we are to determine which value choices to employ is the same 
question as to how to evaluate the costs and benefits in cost-benefit anal-
ysis; again, these are not questions of efficiency but questions of fairness 
and not at the expense of efficiency goals. 107 
Because of the renewed interest in cost-benefit analysis in the policy 
realm,108 there has been a resurgence of interest by law and economic 
scholars in its ramifications. Some articles have extended or expanded 
cost-benefit analysis to new areas by revisiting areas addressed before, 
such as entitlements,109 criminal law, 110 product liability, 111 legislative 
entrenchment, 112 and the value of transitional justice after the toppling of 
a dictatorial regime. l13 These articles extend cost-benefit analysis to fac-
tors beyond those amenable to market place evaluations. 114 Some sug-
gestions include ways of improving the application of cost-benefit 
107 "[T]he very concepts [of economic analysis] are value-loaded ... [and] ... cannot be 
defined except in terms of political valuations." GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN INTERNATIONAL ECON-
OMY 336 (1956). 
108 Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 533, 546-47 (1989); see, e.g., Edward Rubin, It's Time to Make the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 95 (2003). 
109 David A. Super, The Political Economy of Entitlement, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 633 
(2004). 
110 Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 323 (2004); 
Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal 
Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L. J. 949 (2003); Katherine J. 
Strandburg, Deterrence and the Conviction of Innocents, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1321 (2003). 
III Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1700 (2003). 
112 See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Verrneu1e, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reap-
praisal, 111 YALE L. J. 1665 (2002); Stewart E. Sterk, Retrenchment on Entrenchment, 71 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 231 (2003). 
113 Eric A. Posner & Adrian Verrneule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, 117 
HARv. L. REV. 761 (2004). 
114 See Adler & Posner, supra note 82, at 188; Kornhauser, supra note 6. 
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analysis itself, such as taking into consideration the age of the individuals 
affected,115 the importance in social well-being of changing people's 
wealth position relative to others in addition to absolute gains or 
losses, 116 and efforts to consider the distributional effects of cost-benefit 
decisions ll7 as well as the impact of distribution on cost-benefit evalua-
tions. IIB Some have shown how cost-benefit analysis can be a more so-
ber evaluation for improving overall welfare than using merely 
individual preferences when due to various circumstances those prefer-
ences are cognitively distorted (such as a disproportionate fear of the 
spread of a disease or undue influence from promotional efforts in favor 
of a social position or legal presentation). I 19 Some have alerted us as to 
how the requirement of cost-benefit analysis in government can be used 
positively or abused negatively by powerful political coalitions in gov-
ernment to the disadvantage of competing political coalitions.120 Of 
course, the critics of cost-benefit analysis are still there, some because of 
its use at all, particularly objecting to quantifying values such as health, 
safety, and life itself, as well as the efforts to use or mimic market pric-
ing mechanismsPI More often the criticisms are how specific applica-
tions of cost-benefit reasoning have failed to properly assess the true 
costs and benefits.122 But despite these objections, the growing consen-
sus is that some form of cost-benefit reasoning is necessary to make 
meaningful and useful social policy decisions, given the complexities of 
115 Cass R. Sunstein, Lives. Life-years, and Willingness to Pay, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 205 
(2004) (explaining that using one measure for valuing a life lost or saved for all age groups 
does not take into account the number of life-years lost or saved). 
116 Frank & Sunstein, supra note 86; but see Thomas J. Kniesner & W. Kip Viscusi, Why 
Relative Economic Position Does Not Matter: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 20 YALE J. ON REG. I 
(2003). 
117 Mark Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with the Principle that Safety Mat-
ters More than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 114 (2001). 
lIB Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis when Pref-
erences are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105, 1122-24 (2000). 
119 See also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 
Nw. U. L. REv. 1165 (2003). See generally id.; Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059 (2000). 
120 See Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Polit-
ical Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137 (2001); Jason Scott Johnston, A Game Theo-
retic Analysis of Alternative Institutions for Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, ISO U. PA. L. 
REV. 1343 (2002); Emerson H. Tiller, Resource-Based Strategies in Law and Positive Political 
Theory: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Like, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1453 (2002). 
121 See generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (2001); Frank Ack-
erman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Pro-
tection, ISO U. PA. L. REv. 1553 (2002); Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic 
Proportions, 107 YALE L. J. 1981 (1998). 
122 See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, 
Safety and Environmental Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1997 (2002); Lynn E. Blais, Counting 
Costs and Calculating Benefits, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2059 (2002); Vincent DiLorenzo, Cost-Bene-
fit Analysis, Deregulated Markets, and Consumer Benefits: A Study of the Financial Services 
Modernization Experience, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PuB. POL'y 321 (2002-2003). 
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the decisions that need to be made. The question still remains, however, 
as to how to improve its social efficacy-in particular to respond to the 
criticisms of cost-benefit applications in the past. 123 
V. IS THERE A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN EFFICIENCY 
AND FAIRNESS? 
A. THE PROPER ROLE OF DISTRIBUTIONAL CONCERNS: WHEN 
FAIRNESS UNAVOIDABLY ENTERS THE DECISION PROCESS 
Though debates on how to address redistributions will continue, 
there will always be some aspect of transfer of rights or other source of 
well-being affecting overall welfare that are not capable of monetary 
measure or compensation. Therefore, redistributive effects of policy de-
cisions must be considered at the time the policy decision is made, in-
stead of relying on corrections after the fact. Such redistributive 
considerations have been interpreted in much of the literature-in econom-
ics,124 law and economics,125 and criticisms of law and economics l26-
as constituting a trade-off between fairness and efficiency. In particular, 
considering distributive aspects has been construed typically to mean that 
the decision-maker must choose between an (economically) inefficient 
course that is distributionally fair or an efficient course that ignores dis-
tributional concerns. 
But that is not the argument here. To the contrary, the assertion is 
that the purpose of considering distributional concerns is not to opt for an 
inefficient state but to choose from among different efficient states and to 
do so on the basis of social values of fairness. 
As indicated above,127 there are, invariably, a multitude of efficient 
choices, each one associated with a different distribution, consistent with 
different values of fairness. It is self-evident from the earlier analysis 
that regardless of what values society possesses with regard to fairness, 
society would prefer to choose a state of the world in which some people 
were better off with no one worse off over those states in which some 
123 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGU· 
LATORY PROTECTION (2002); Abramowicz, supra note 6. 
124 OKUN, supra note 3. Okun served on the Council of Economic Advisors as well as on 
the Yale faculty in the Economics department and discovered the empirical observation known 
as Okun's Law characterizing the inverse relationship between economic growth and unem-
ployment rates. 
125 A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND EcONOMICS 7-10 (2d ed. 
1989). 
126 Martha T. McCluskey, Subsidized Lives and the Ideology of Efficiency, 8 AM. U. 1. 
GENDER & Soc. POL'y & L. 115 (1999). 
127 See supra notes 90-99 and accompanying text. 
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were worse off with no one better off. 128 By definition, this means that 
society would always prefer a Pareto efficient state than an inefficient 
state. Of course, the determination of what constitutes "better off' versus 
"worse off' is, in itself, a value choice. But once that is determined, it is 
only reasonable then to select as potential candidates those states in 
which it is not possible to improve someone' s lot without reducing some-
one else's. Those potential candidates are all the Pareto Optimal (or effi-
cient) states. 
Thus, once determining the set of possible Pareto Optimal efficient 
states, selecting from the various efficient choices requires the imple-
mentation of fairness criteria. Efficiency and fairness considerations 
complement each other to bring the most benefit to society with regard to 
both aspects; they are not in conflict with each other, as advocates and 
critics of efficiency analysis often conclude. The significant inquiry is to 
determine when and how efficiency and fairness concerns ought to be 
addressed. 
Of course, it is possible for some efficient choices to be coupled 
with counter-redistributional adjustments. For example, accompanying a 
policy decision with tax policy that adequately compensates the losers 
may be efficient (or at least a Pareto Superior move) and alleviate the 
need to make a value choice regarding the distribution effect. Given, 
however, that most decisions serve to expand the pie of well-being with 
multiple options, choosing which expansion and how it is to be allocated 
require distributional considerations. Moreover, since in the real world 
most expansions benefit some individuals at the expense of others, addi-
tional distributional issues arise, not all (or perhaps none) of which can 
be corrected by tax policy. 129 Finally, it is possible for a policy-maker to 
128 For example, suppose the consensus is that a particular state that is not efficient is 
distributionally "fair," by whatever criteria for fairness is chosen. If this "fair" state is ineffi-
cient, i.e., non-Pareto Optimal, then by definition this means that some people's lot in this state 
can be improved without making anyone else worse off. For our purposes, we are taking into 
consideration the feelings, tastes and levels of satisfaction of individuals about all things and 
not just consumable goods. Therefore, there could be no objection to the Pareto Optimal ver-
sion of this 'fair" state over the inefficient less well-off non-Pareto Optimal state. Thus for 
every state considered to be fair, there is a Pareto Optimal version of that state. Thus it is safe 
to conclude that whatever are the potential candidates for the set of states of the world that are 
fair, the only ones that should be chosen are the Pareto Optimal versions of each state. 
129 One after-the-fact remedy proposed is to engage in cost-benefit analysis solely exam-
ining efficiency criteria and resolving any distributional consequences through tax policy. 
Though generally critical of this justification in Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 
86 CORNELL L. REv. 1003 (2001), Chris William Sanchirico gives a succinct explanation of 
the argument at Note 2: 
Why does the ability to precisely and costlessly effect such corrective transfers jus-
tify setting legal rules solely on the basis of efficiency? Suppose, to take an extreme 
example, that the state demands perfect equality, but that, given perfect equality, it 
prefers that the equal amount allocated to each individual be greater rather than 
smaller. Imagine that the state has the ability to costlessly "re-slice the pie" however 
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conclude that by one measure, the social welfare pie is expanded, but 
under a different evaluation, the benefits to those who gain may be less 
than those who lose for any particular course of action. Therefore, when-
ever distribution is involved, as it is in most undertakings, a value choice 
affecting community members as to which course to take is complex, 
unavoidable and cannot be sidestepped through efficiency analysis. 130 
it pleases. Further, consider a world in which legal rules are inefficient, but there is 
perfect equality. Then, the state should change legal rules so that they are effi-
cient-i.e., so that they maximize the size of the pie-even if that initially produces 
inequality. After changing legal rules, the state can always re-slice the larger pie to 
restore the system to perfect equality. The end result is still perfect equality, but 
each individual now has greater wealth .... 
See also Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the 
Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821 
(2000) (responding to earlier criticism by Sanchirico). A number of problems exist, however, 
with relying on tax policy. One is the lack of political will as such remedies are contingent on 
legislative and executive action, which also respond to lobbying efforts. See, e.g., Scott Sha-
piro & Edward F. McClennen, Law-and-Economics from a Philosophical Perspective, in 2 
THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 460,463 (Peter Newman ed., 
1998) (according to law and economics scholars it would take a "radical restructuring of cur-
rent political systems" to effectuate the income redistribution that also justifies ignoring the 
distributional consequences of legal rules). A second is that not all redistributions are compen-
sable through monetary means. For example, the decision to send troops to war sacrifices some 
lives for the benefit of others and is difficult to compensate through financial redress. Regard-
ing one controversial attempt to do so, see Justin Huggler, Iraq:The Aftermath: Palestinian 
Families Mourn the Passing of Saddam 's Donations for Suicide Bombers and Martyrs, INDEP., 
May 7, 2003, at 12. A number of practical difficulties have been noted over the years as well, 
for example, issues of imperfect information and behavioral consequences. See generally 
Sanchirico, supra. 
130 The significance of choice of distributive effect", is implicitly or explicitly recognized 
in a number of recent works exploring the extent of the proper role of efficiency analysis. For 
example, Adler and Posner argue that "overall well-being is morally relevant. Government 
should choose a welfare-improving project, but all things considered, nonwelfarist considera-
tions (for example, distributive or deontological considerations) may properly lead to the ulti-
mate rejection of that project." Supra note 82, at 196. Though this may sound like an 
argument for a trade-off between efficiency and fairness, it is not. Adler and Posner are 
merely considering one project. Its rejection in the face of fairness concerns does not preclude 
choosing other welfare-improving projects that better satisfy those concerns. See also Kaplow 
& Shavell, supra note 4. 
There are a number of explanations for the common belief that income distribution is 
unimportant in normative economic analysis of law. First, some law and economics 
scholars have stated (incorrectly, in our view) that distribution ought not matter in 
principle. Second, much law and economic analysis omits distributional considera-
tions, and many legal academics do not seem to appreciate that, even if one thir.;.J 
that income distribution is important, there are often good reasons for leaving it aside 
in one's analysis (as we discuss in the text to follow). Third, because the framework 
of welfare economics has not been well presented in the legal academic literature, 
we believe that there is a lack of familiarity with the welfare economic approach and 
the reasons that the distribution of income is important under that approach." Id. at 
989-90 n.53. 
The authors later offer practical reasons why income distribution considerations should be set 
aide despite their acknowledgement of the importance of such considerations. See id. at 980-
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The query is then, when selecting from the range of efficient 
choices, whether there are criteria to guide or parameters to limit deonto-
logical decisions so they indeed enhance overall social well-being. 
There is a considerable body of literature in law and other fields that 
address what values society does or ought to promote; an in-depth dis-
cussion of those issues is beyond the scope here. Instead, this article's 
purpose is to delineate when value choices necessarily enter the decision-
process and to offer some guidance for selecting from among the availa-
ble choices. 
B. KAPLOW & SHAVELL'S FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 
1. Kaplow & Shavell's Social Welfare Criteria 
Before proceeding to the proposals on parameters of fairness set 
forth below, it is important to discuss a recent significant and controver-
sial contribution to the law and economics literature that has made its 
own assessment regarding the role of fairness in decisions to enhance 
social welfare; that is the work of Kaplow and Shavell, appearing in their 
publication, Fairness Versus Welfare. I3I A full analysis of the contro-
versy is not presented here but aspects of it are that will prove useful for 
our purposes. 
On its face, Kaplow and Shavell's article I32 states that whatever 
guidelines policy-makers choose, they should only choose those policies 
that increase overall welfare based on the increase of individuals' wel-
fare, and not consider independently any ethical or other deontological 
values in the decision process. I33 This conclusion has generated consid-
erable criticism in part because their assertion appears to mirror earlier 
positions taken by law and economics scholars supporting wealth-max-
imization principles that now have been largely softened or abandoned. 
Law and economics scholars who argued for the adoption of wealth-
maximization (which focused almost exclusively on economic wealth) 
often claimed that issues of distribution were irrelevant or at least outside 
the purview of economic reasoning, or should be dealt with exogenously 
98. The author discusses Kaplow & Shavell in more detail infra text accompanying notes 148-
54. 
131 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 4. 
132 Harvard Law Review chose to publish the authors' book in its entirety in one issue of 
the journal. See supra note 4. The page references here are all to the law review version. 
133 "Our central claim is that the welfare-based normative approach should be exclusively 
employed in evaluating legal rules. That is, legal rules should be selected entirely with respect 
to their effects on the well-being of individuals in society. This position implies that notions 
of fairness like corrective justice should receive no independent weight in the assessment of 
legal rules." Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 4, at 967. 
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through tax policy.134 The older law and economic positions often as-
serted that there was indeed a trade-off between fairness and efficiency 
but that, nevertheless, the best social welfare enhancing policy was to 
pursue maximizing efficiency, even at the expense of fairness,135 a 
highly criticized position. 
Kaplow and Shavell's thesis is broader as well as different from the 
older wealth-maximization arguments that ignored the distributional con-
cerns. First, Kaplow and Shavell posit a measure of individual welfare 
that includes more than just pecuniary benefits but also includes individ-
ual taste for non-pecuniary benefits, in particular but not limited to, ethi-
cal and justice concerns. Most importantly, the authors then make a 
distinction between policy evaluations that consider fairness (using "fair-
ness" as a term to encompass all ethical and moral concerns) when fair-
ness enhances individuals' welfare because of their taste for it and 
considerations of fairness as a value to pursue apart from when it enters 
any individual's preferences. Kaplow and Shavell then argue that fair-
ness should only be included in the decision process to the extent that 
individuals have a taste for it and not because it appeals to ethical con-
cerns. In other words, fairness should be included solely because it en-
hances the welfare of those who have a taste for it and not for any reason 
of principle. 136 
2. Kaplow & Shavell's Definition of Fairness 
It is clear that when fairness is a factor in individuals' welfare, it 
reflects value choices made by those individuals. To this extent, Kaplow 
and Shavell have designed a means to capture the variations among com-
munity members' value choices. Kaplow and Shavell then suggest that 
for policy purposes, social welfare is then measured by aggregating all 
the individuals' welfare, though the authors offer no suggestion to imple-
ment such aggregation. This is significant with respect to Kaplow and 
Shavell's results because it is in the aggregation that additional value 
choices must be made, this time by the policy-maker and not dictated by 
individuals' tastes. Aggregation requires interpersonal comparisons in 
order to weigh and balance the cumulative benefits against the cumula-
tive costs and this requires establishing some criteria to weigh each indi-
vidual's welfare against another's. Clearly, it is an ethical decision what 
134 Arguments that tax policy should address distribution issues remain, even though the 
dominance of the wealth-maximization approach has receded. See supra note 129. 
135 The leading proponent of the wealth-maximization principle has been Judge (then Pro-
fessor) Richard Posner. See generally, Richard Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (4th ed. 
1992); Richard Posner, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1983). 
136 "We further note a particular source of well-being that has special relevance to our 
Article, namely, the possibility that individuals have a taste for a notion of fairness, just as they 
may have a taste for art, nature, or fine wine." Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 4, at 982. 
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weight a policy-maker gives to different individuals' welfare (e.g., 
poorer persons more heavily than richer persons, or all equally, or by 
some other criteria). Kaplow and Shavell acknowledge this,137 but refer 
the reader to other literature on the subject. 138 They merely point out 
that such value choices must be made in order to determine what consti~ 
tutes an enhancement of social welfare; they only require that social wel-
fare rises from increases in the aggregation of individual welfare. 139 
There are three important observations to be made regarding 
Kaplow and Shavell' s work. One is the distinction between Kaplow and 
Shavell's goal of enhancing social welfare as they define it and the older 
wealth-maximization principle. In wealth-maximization analysis, tne fo-
cus was usually on economic goods and services and did not concern 
itself with more ideational concerns that would affect individuals' well-
being. The traditional law and economic approach thus skewed policy 
recommendations towards a form of consumerism as the creator and 
measure of happiness. In addition, wealth-maximization made an im-
plicit value choice both in how to aggregate individuals' welfare to mea-
sure social welfare overall and in what constituted individual welfare. It 
did so by using market prices, whether actual or imputed, as the metric to 
calculate well-being. As noted earlier,140 market-price calculations, 
among other problems, tend to bias decisions in favor of those who are 
more financially wealthy, giving those individuals as well as their prefer-
ences more weight in the measurement of welfare. Market prices do not 
have the neutrality or reflection of society's overall values as many law 
and economic scholars originally asserted. 141 
The second observation regarding Kaplow and Shavell' s work is the 
implication of their argument that fairness principles should be used in 
137 "[AJ method of aggregation is of necessity an element of welfare economics, and 
value judgments are involved in aggregating different individuals' well-being into a single 
measure of social welfare. The choice of a method of aggregation involves the adoption of a 
view concerning matters of distribution ... Various methods of aggregation are possible." 
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 4, at 987. 
138 "[WJe do not defend any specific way of aggregating individuals' well-being; that is, 
we do not endorse any particular view about the proper distribution of well-being or income. 
Rather, we argue, in essence, that legal policy analysis should be guided by reference to some 
coherent way of aggregating individuals' well-being, in contrast to the view that policy analy-
sis should be guided by notions of fairness and thus, at least in part, without regard to individu-
als' well-being." [d. at 988. The authors actually indicate some value preference of their own 
a little earlier in the section, "It is ... generally supposed that each individual's well-being 
affects social welfare in a symmetric manner, which is to say that the idea of social welfare 
incorporates a basic notion of equal concern for all individuals." [d. at 985-86. This apparent 
inconsistency, however, may be the result of the inherent vagueness of notions of fairness and 
justice. 
139 "Specifically, social welfare is postulated to be an increasing function of individuals' 
well-being and to depend on no other factors." [d. at 985. 
140 See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text. 
141 [d. 
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the decision process only to the extent that there are individuals who 
have a taste for fairness (so as to increase their welfare by its presence) 
and not solely because some people will be made better off from its ap-
plication. Despite the tenor of their assertion, this does not mean that 
decisions guided by fairness principles for which individuals have a 
taste, do not also enhance the well-being of those who are the recipients 
of that fairness application. In fact, to the contrary, under Kaplow and 
Shavell's recommendation, any extent to which decisions incorporate 
fairness to enhance the welfare of those who have a taste for it will also 
benefit those who are recipients of implementing that fairness. The fact 
that fairness is included based on people's preferences for it does not 
circumscribe the effects of its inclusion solely to those individuals whose 
preferences dictate it. Therefore, the full welfare-enhancing impact of 
included fairness principles will manifest itself in the aggregation pro-
cess and is likely to affect more individuals than just those who have a 
preference for it. 
Furthermore, the implication of Kaplow and Shavell's notion of pol-
icy evaluations based on the extent to which individuals' welfare is en-
hanced is really broader than simply including fairness according to 
individuals' taste for it. Although Kaplow and Shavell suggest no partic-
ular method for aggregating individuals' welfare to derive a measure of 
social welfare, they do not rule out, for example, considering distribu-
tional concerns in the aggregation process, concepts normally identified 
with principles of fairness. 142 They merely point out that distributional 
elements should be only implemented in order to increase overall welfare 
and not as an independent value unto itself.143 Thus the "fairness" that 
Kaplow and Shavell state should not be considered in policy decisions is, 
in fact, quite narrowly defined; it consists only those aspects of "fair-
ness" that do not enhance individuals' welfare. l44 
142 The matters of distribution that Kaplow and Shavell refer to, however, are in essence 
decisions regarding fairness, though fairness in the broader, more commonly understood, sense 
rather in Kaplow and Shavell's narrower non-welfare-enhancing sense, as discussed infra 
notes 146-54 and accompanying text. In fact, the aggregation process in Kaplow and Shavell's 
framework cannot take place without some form of deontological decisions. See discussion 
supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text. For specific examples of the need for fairness 
decisions in Kaplow and Shavell's aggregation process, see, e.g., Michael B. Dorff, Why Wel-
fare Depends on Fairness: A Reply to Kaplow and Shavell, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 847 (2002). 
143 "[D]istribution can play an important role even under a system of evaluation that is 
concerned exclusively with individuals' well-being ... [T]he criticisms of notions of fairness 
that we offer are not criticisms of the language that analysts use or of the need to make value 
judgments in assessing legal policy; rather, they are specific criticisms of giving weight to 
factors that are independent of individuals' well-being. Hence, our analysis does not affect 
distributive judgments that are confined to individuals' well-being." Kaplow & Shavell, supra 
note 4, at 989. 
144 See infra note 145. 
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The third important observation about Kaplow and Shavell's work 
is how the authors use their concept of fairness, the significance of which 
seems to have been overlooked by many of their critics. After distin-
guishing between the elements of fairness that enhances individuals' 
welfare from those elements that do not, the authors then define and use 
the term "fairness" for the balance of their article as only that part of 
fairness that does not enhance any community member's welfare. 145 
Thus, their use of the term "fairness" does not include all aspects of 
fairness but only those aspects that are solely abstract principles and un-
related to anyone's well-being. 146 It is only then, with their circum-
scribed definition of "fairness", that Kaplow and Shavell can 
demonstrate that (their) "fairness" should never be considered part of the 
value choices a policymaker uses when selecting from various courses of 
actions to enhance welfare. 
Their conclusion is based on an analytical demonstration that if the 
authors' definition of "fairness" is taken into account as an independent 
factor, it is possible for the policy-maker to elect a course of action that, 
in order to satisfy this non-welfare enhancing fairness principle, will 
cause at least some people to be worse off and no one to be better off as 
compared with ignoring the "fairness" criteria. 147 In other words, there 
may be only a net decline in overall social welfare and with no winners 
and only losers. Kaplow and Shavell argue that, presumably, no one 
145 "[OJur definition of notions of fairness includes all principles-but only those princi-
ples-that give weight to factors that are independent of individuals' well-being." Kaplow & 
Shavell, supra note 4, at 989. 
146 This has been recognized from different perspectives by others. See, e.g., Howard F. 
Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle, 110 
YALE L. J. 173, 178 (2000) (" [AJlthough Kaplow and Shavell may present an effective cri-
tique of some theories of fairness, their critique cannot reasonably be viewed as effective 
against all theories of fairness"). 
147 In order to capture the essence of Kaplow and Shavell's argument that fairness should 
never be considered as an independent factor when making policy decisions to maximize so-
cial well-being, it is important to recall that Kaplow and Shavell define fairness for their argu-
ment's purpose as a principle that a policy-maker might admire but one that does not enhance 
well-being per se. Supra note 145. The essence of Kaplow and Shavell's argument is as 
follows: Assume that we have a State of the World A that yields a certain level of social well-
being. Suppose we change that world to accommodate a principle of fairness to State of the 
World B, though the application of that principle, by definition, does not enhance anyone's 
well-being by social welfare measures. Since the only adjustment that has been made is to 
accommodate this principle of fairness-that means that nobody can be better off in State of 
the World B as compared with the original State of the World A. So, at the very least, no 
welfare has been enhanced. And, because State B constitutes a redistribution of goods, ser-
vices, non-pecuniary and ideational values available to society at that time, though it is not 
possible that this redistribution to State B made anyone better off because it has no welfare 
enhancing properties, it is conceivable that in fact the redistribution made some people worse 
off. Hence Kaplow and Shavell's conclusion that fairness, as an independent principle, should 
never be considered in a policy-maker's decision process. The most rigorous formal exposi-
tion of their argument is found in Kaplow & ShavelI, supra note 4, at 1012-14 n.102. 
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would prefer a course of action that only makes some or more people 
worse off and makes no one better off, regardless of whether principles 
of justice were adhered to. Their conclusion, and their article's title, 
gives a strong impression that they have proved, once again, that there is 
a trade-off between fairness and efficiency where efficiency implies 
welfare. 
But this is not, in fact, what they have shown. They have only 
shown that including the non-welfare enhancing aspects of fairness prin-
ciples in a welfare-enhancing decision process may possibly reduce wel-
fare and will certainly not increase it. Given that Kaplow and Shavell's 
definition of "fairness" is limited to only those aspects of fairness that do 
not enhance welfare, clearly a trade-off between satisfying non-welfare 
enhancing principles and welfare-enhancing guidelines is not unex-
pected. To a certain extent, their conclusion is intuitively obvious. The 
question is, is it meaningful? 
3. What Are the Implications of Kaplow & Shavell's 
Conclusions? 
Kaplow and Shavell's conclusions, as expressed by their title, make 
a considerably stronger statement than in fact their arguments actually 
show. It is this stronger interpretation that has led, in part, to the contro-
versy surrounding their work and as a result obfuscates many of their 
substantive contributions towards clarifying effective means for includ-
ing value choices in decision-making processes. 
Most significantly, what seems overlooked is that the original moti-
vation for establishing principles of fairness is for the very purpose of 
contributing to the community'S overall sense of well-being. Though 
one might complain that many legal principles of justice have taken on a 
life of their own,148 both in rhetoric and legal analysis, the ultimate goal, 
fundamentally, is to improve the community's welfare. 149 There is more 
to welfare enhancing fairness than just those aspects that enter into the 
tastes and preferences of individuals. Those aspects enter into decisions 
about aggregating individual welfare and choosing among distribution 
outcomes. 
As an illustration, suppose equality among community members is 
interpreted rigidly to generate a legal standard requiring equal income for 
148 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing, 88 MINN. L. 
REV.1556 (2004) (addressing in effect the same issues as Kaplow and Shavell, albeit from a 
different perspective). 
149 See Rubin, supra note I, at 1412. He writes, "Rights do not justify themselves, nor do 
they possess inherent legitimacy, no matter how hard one squints at precedents or the text of 
the Constitution. Their value, rather, is to be judged in terms of their ability to advance under-
lying social purposes." [d. 
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all. 150 Take into consideration that there is a distribution of talents, one 
that does not endow everyone equally. Under legal standard of equal 
income for all, a more talented individual would not be rewarded for any 
effort beyond what is necessary to contribute to the standard distribution 
of income. The disincentives to applying his or her talent fully would 
likely reduce the economic pie available for distribution for everyone. 
At the extreme, the equal distribution of income rule could lead to each 
member of the community living at barely subsistence levels. 
If, in the alternative, there is some reward for being more produc-
tive, thereby allowing some to earn more than others, it is quite possible 
that people would be willing to work more according to their abilities 
and/or expend greater effort, thereby producing collectively a considera-
bly larger economic pie. A value choice could then be implemented 
through a decision to redistribute this larger economic pie. It would be 
possible, for example, to set a threshold standard of living below which 
no one would fall, and to provide for this by taxing the wealthier propor-
tionately more to generate tax revenues to distribute as income to those 
less well off. Everyone would be better off overall, though not mathe-
matically equally so, by allowing for some differences in income distri-
bution. What particular standard is used to distribute (or redistribute) the 
pie would also be a value choice. 
So, for example, it seems unlikely that society would choose to ad-
here to a principle of equality rigidly defined as equal income, preferring 
a world in which everyone has precisely equal income but at a subsis-
tence level, to a world in which everyone lives at least comfortably 
well-though some are somewhat better off than others. 151 And in fact, 
typically, notions of equality do not include absolute equal treatment. 152 
It is not difficult to see how Kaplow and Shavell reach their conclu-
sion, given the way they framed the issue. By defining "fairness" as only 
that part of fairness that does not enhance welfare, it is evident that incor-
porating a factor that does not enhance the community members' welfare 
in the decision process (merely to adhere some abstract principle) will 
150 This is not unlike the notion of equality that was applied to health benefits that ini-
tially prevented women from having health coverage in the workplace that was as tailored to 
their needs as the men's were. See supra discussion accompanying notes 50-56. 
15 1 This does not mean that there could not be some boundaries around how large the 
spread in income distribution would be. That could be accomplished by a progressive tax 
policy in which the rich pay a proportionally greater amount of their income to support social 
functions that the poor with a sliding scale in-between. Of course, many arguments have been 
made for not relying solely on tax policy to accomplish society's chosen ends. See, e.g., 
Sanchirico, supra note 129, at 1064-69. 
152 See, e.g., Daniel Markovits, How Much Redistribution Should There Be? I 12 YALE L. 
J. 2291 (2003). 
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inevitably lead to some decisions that render the community worse 
off. 153 
But Kaplow and Shavell's result, despite the title of their article, 
does not eliminate the consideration of fairness principles per se. What 
their work shows is that the fairness principles that should be pursued are 
those that enhance social welfare; even then, however, only those aspects 
of the principles that truly enhance welfare should be implemented. 154 
This is an important and useful insight that supports rather than un-
dermines the use of fairness in policy considerations. It provides param-
eters on fairness principles so that their use indeed ensures that society's 
welfare is improved overall. Kaplow and Shavell, however, give little 
guidance for determining what fairness principles do enhance welfare 
beyond those elements that enter people's individual preferences. They 
leave that discussion to others. 
VI. PARAMETERS OF FAIRNESS THAT DO 
ENHANCE WELFARE 
Differences imply choices, and choices imply judgment. 
We cannot escape from making judgments and the judg-
ments that we make arise from the ethical preconcep-
tions that have soaked into our view of life and are 
somehow imprinted in our brains .... We can see what 
we value, and try to see why. 155 
[M]oral heuristics playa pervasive role in moral, politi-
cal, and legal judgments, and ... they produce serious 
mistakes .... Usually such heuristics work well. The 
problem arises when the generalizations are wrenched 
out of context and treated as freestanding or universal 
153 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 4, at 971. Kaplow and Shavell in effect acknowledge 
this when they slate: 
[d. 
Our first argument, that advancing notions of fairness reduces individuals' well-be-
ing, is in fact lautological on a general level. By definition, welfare economic analy-
sis is concerned with individuals' well-being, whereas fairness-based analysis (to the 
extent that it differs from welfare economic analysis) is concerned with adherence to 
certain stipulated principles that do not depend on individuals' well-being. Thus, 
promoting notions of fairness may well involve a reduction individuals' well-being. 
154 Other authors make similar inferences regarding Kaplow and Shavell's conclusions 
although they disagree with the two authors. For instance, Professor Fallon writes, "Kaplow 
and Shavell imply that there are no moral rights not directly founded on considerations of 
individual well-being." Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Should We All Be Welfare Economists? 101 
MICH. L. REv. 979, 980 (2003). Furthermore, Professor Farnsworth writes, "Kaplow and 
Shave\1's acknowledgment that policies should take fairness into account if people have a taste 
for it has more implications than they recognize." Ward Farnsworth, The Taste for Fairness, 
102 COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 1993 (2002). 
155 JOAN ROBINSON, ECONOMIC PHILOSOPHY 14 (1962). 
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principles, applicable to situations in which their justifi-
cations no longer operate."156 
The significant import of Kaplow and Shavell's work, that fairness 
principles should be pursued to the extent they enhance social welfare 
and not for independent deontological concerns, opens another question: 
when do principles of fairness enhance welfare beyond individuals' taste 
for it? Not only do different individuals have different ideas about what 
is welfare enhancing, even for themselves, but it is also difficult to cap-
ture what constitutes "in the best interest of the community," leading to a 
panoply of ethical values. Thus, the challenges facing a policy-maker are 
not simply how to reflect community values in the evaluation process, 
but which among conflicting values should be adopted. 
As already discussed, values enter into the calculus of overall wel-
fare at two levels. One is at the individual level that Kaplow and Shavell 
focus on, when each individual's measure of his or her own welfare in-
cludes that individual's own ethical choices that improve welfare for that 
individual. Whatever method of aggregation of individuals' welfare is 
applied, the result will likely reflect in some fashion the community's 
differing values. The second level of value choice does not provide such 
readily comprehensive measures of collective attitudes. At the second 
level, the policy-maker must choose among different Pareto efficient pol-
icies, each of which benefit different community members and some-
times will involve the sacrifice of welfare of others. These decisions 
reflect the same values chosen to weight individuals in order to aggregate 
each individual's welfare. If the policy-maker seeks to "reflect commu-
nity values," the differing values among the community members render 
such a decision on that basis alone nearly impossible. As a result, the 
policy-maker is left to make his or her own choice between competing 
values, reflecting his or her own notions of justice, and this is unavoida-
ble. ls7 Selecting from among the Pareto efficient choices is the range in 
which the choice is "political" in the sense intended by the critical legal 
studies movement: within the range of Pareto efficient choices, the wel-
fare-enhancing choice is subject to the values of the decision-maker.ls8 
However, the range of political choice can be and is narrowed fur-
ther in accordance to society's overall wishes than just the parameters 
156 Sunstein, supra note 148, at 1558. 
157 "Fairness principles, for example, might be principles designed to resolve disputes 
only when preferences conflict; these principles would not be relevant when preferences are 
unanimous. It should seem natural to restrict the domain of fairness principles in this way: If 
there is unanimous agreement that one state of affairs is better than another, then there would 
be no issue for fairness principles to resolve." Chang, supra note 146, at 209. 
158 In a congruous assertion in the context of criminal law, see Dan M. Kahan, The The-
ory of Value Dilemma: A Critique of the Economic Analysis of Criminal Law, I OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 643 (2004). 
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that Pareto efficiency offers. This further restriction arises from gener-
ally accepted principles of fairness, that over time, have gained social 
consensus that their pursuit does indeed enhance social welfare overall. 
These parameters ensue from the application of specific principles of 
fairness that have emerged, for example, into legal precepts and rules 
that set boundaries on legislative, executive, and judicial decision-mak-
ing. They do not evolve from cost-benefit reasoning or other efficiency 
analysis,159 but they nevertheless reflect a community's intuition and ex-
perience that pursuing these principles enhances community well-be-
ing. 160 These principles of fairness are not fully determinative of every 
decision, but they do limit further the range of choice and the extent of 
the "political" in the policy-maker's decision process. They serve as pa-
rameters of fairness that circumscribe policy choices to stay within the 
range over which there is broad consensus of what constitutes acceptable 
states of social well-being. 
It is possible to point to a number of legal principles that serve as 
parameters of fairness yet still see that they are not completely determi-
native of social choice. Constitutional rights such as equal protection, 
the ban against takings, and due process are all examples of socially 
sanctioned parameters not only for choice among competing courses of 
action but also as boundaries on the evaluation of costs and benefits. 
Nevertheless, jurisprudence demonstrates that these principles do not al-
ways yield unambiguous determinative conclusions. Certainly, conflict-
ing values over the choices within the acceptable range are indicated 
every time the Supreme Court does not reach a unanimous decision as to 
what rules effectively implement these rights. In addition, the Court's 
attitude as to what constitutes effective rules changes over time, some-
times because of changing circumstances or knowledge, or sometimes 
because of changes in the composition of the Court. 161 
Common law principles in the various areas of law also emerge to 
promote social welfare but are modified over time as circumstances indi-
159 However, there has been considerable effort by law and economics scholars to demon-
strate, after the fact, that many of these principles do reflect efficient choices, even though not 
consciously so. See. e.g., Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups 
for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. EcON. 371 (1983) (arguing that, as a result, legislation tends 
towards efficiency); George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient 
Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977). 
160 Kaplow and Shavell also acknowledge this fact: "There is another respect in which 
notions of fairness may be relevant under welfare economics: they may serve as proxy devices 
to aid in identifying legal policies that tend to advance individuals' well-being." Kaplow & 
Shavell, supra note 4, at 975. 
161 For example, the Court's revision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), of the trimester rule for abortions set forth in Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). reflects such a change, with some controversy. See, e.g., Tom R. 
Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Author-
ity: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L. J. 703 (1994). 
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cate that change is necessary to enhance community well-being. 162 The 
doctrine of res ipso loquitur in tort law emerged in part because techno-
logical advances created complexities that made it impossible for some 
plaintiffs to prove negligence on the part of the defendant for suffered 
harm even though the circumstances were such that there was no other 
reasonable conclusion but the culpability of the defendant. 163 Kaplow 
and Shavell's own work examines a number of legal principles and rules 
that, though originally designed to promote community welfare, in their 
analysis, no longer best serve to do SO.I64 But despite the regions of am-
biguity that still remain, these principles of justice serve as important 
parameters to limit choice of outcome; the decision-maker chooses, when 
necessary, according to his or her own moral compunctions but within 
the boundaries set by the principles' constraints, constraints adopted by 
society in its own self-interest. 
There is a growing body of literature offering additional suggestions 
as to how to make the areas of ambiguity even smaller and narrower. 
Many of them propose guidelines for making interpersonal comparisons 
in order to gauge, in some "fair" way, the level of social welfare. 165 
There is no consensus, of course, and though differences in perspective 
among scholars may dissolve on some issues over time, ultimately, fun-
damental differences will always exist. Scholars and communities will 
always debate what should be, or how to determine, morally correct 
choices. Morality cannot be logically reasoned; it is a sentiment that is 
felt and varies across individuals. 166 
Nevertheless, consensuses emerge regarding some social norms or 
values as being in the best interests of the community and they serve as 
parameters limiting the range of value choices that individual decision-
makers might elect. 167 It is important to recognize the role these parame-
162 For example, the development of proximate cause used to consider the complexities of 
modern technology and resulting changes in community standards is discussed in Patrick J. 
Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: History, Theory, and the Present Darkness, 69 
WASH. U.L.Q. 49 (1991). 
163 See, e.g., Mark F. Grady, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Compliance Error, 142 U. PA. L. 
REV. 887 (1994) (discussing the relationship between the doctrine and technological advance 
yielding a more likely presumption of compliance errors on the part of defendant). 
164 Kaplow & Shavell examine legal rules for their welfare-enhancement capabilities in 
tort, contracts, legal procedure and law enforcement. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 4, at 
1039, 1102, 1164, 1225 and subsequent pages. 
165 See supra notes 108-23. 
166 ROBINSON, supra note 155, at 12 ("Reason will not help. The ethical system im-
planted in each of us by our upbringing ... was not derived from any reasonable principles"). 
167 See Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 587 
(1998): 
I place 'social' before 'norm' to indicate a consensus in a community concerning 
what people ought to do. By this convention, agreement about what people ought to 
do indicates a possible social norm, whereas disagreement indicates a struggle to 
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ters play; they serve to enhance social well-being and not to conflict with 
it, as many law and economics scholars propose. A social or moral value 
should not be eschewed because of an erroneously held belief that it un-
dermines social welfare; 168 nor should social welfare be eschewed in the 
erroneous belief that it is necessary to adhere to a moral principle. 169 In 
fact, morality and welfare should be mutually supportive of each other; 
notions of fairness should modify over time as the nature of well-being 
changes due to changes in economic, technological and political struc-
ture. Furthermore, indicia of welfare should also modify over time as 
changes in concepts of fairness that enhance a community'S well-being 
evolve, either through deeper philosophical, ethical, or psychological un-
derstanding, or through a changing social environment. Thus, though it is 
not possible to have a means for determinative solutions for all possible 
questions of choice, there is substantial guidance for decision-makers to 
make value choices in a variety of potential welfare enhancing direc-
tions-guidance that reflects community values despite conflicting views 
within those values. 
VII. FEMINIST CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PARAMETERS OF 
WELFARE-ENHANCING FAIRNESS 
A. REASONS FOR USING OUTSIDER SCHOLARSHIP 
The number of resources for improving decisions regarding compet-
ing values is considerable: judicial opinion, legislative and executive ac-
tion, as well as academic scholarship. Nevertheless, outsider scholars 
criticize mainstream doctrinality for shortcomings in its application of 
fairness and justice. The focus of outsider scholarship is the failure of 
traditional principles of justice to include adequately the well-being of 
specific outsider groups, most notably women, minorities and those of 
alternative sexual orientation. The very existence of outsider scholar-
ship, however, indicates that our mainstream principles and rules of fair-
ness fail to be inclusive of the entire community, despite the expressed or 
create a social norm. Consensus over an obligation, however, is not enough for the 
existence of a social norm. Following the positive theory of law, I also require a 
social norm to affect what people do, not just what they say. In brief, I use 'social 
norm' ... to mean an effective consensus obligation. By this definition, a norm 
exists when almost everyone in a community agrees that they ought to behave in a 
particular way in specific circumstances, and this agreement affects what people 
actually do. 
168 Farnsworth, supra note 154, at 1993 ("It may be that beliefs about faimess capture 
costs and benefits in a way different from, and preferable to, the way they are likely to be 
captured in an economist's analysis ... "). 
169 Richard Craswell, Kaplow and Shavell on the Substance of Fairness, 32 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 245, 246 (2003) ("In any case in which a fairness theory would conflict with welfarism, 
why should we believe that the fairness theory has properly identified those acts that are truly 
unfair?). 
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implicit intent to enhance community welfare in general. This suggests 
that weaknesses in the parameters of fairness may also fail to include 
others who fall outside the mainstream perspective, even if only tempo-
rarily so-as victims of corporate harm often do. The failure may be 
exacerbated when decision-makers make choices among various ven-
tures that impact faceless individuals. If true, then perhaps the methodol-
ogy employed by outsider scholars to uncover discrimination against and 
extend fairness to discrete outsider groups such as women and minori-
ties, can also be used to expand the set of parameters of welfare-enhanc-
ing fairness for decision-making in general. 
The distributional impact inevitably created by policy choices moti-
vates the expansion of the set of parameters of welfare-enhancing fair-
ness. Economic reasoning can only go so far by determining the Pareto 
Optimal set of welfare-enhancing options,170 but selecting from among 
those possibilities still involves a further decision as to who will be bene-
ficiaries and who will bear the cost of any action.l7I Though mainstream 
guidelines and parameters of fairness limit the range by limiting the al-
lowable distributions of pecuniary and ideational impacts,172 awareness 
of the full distributional aspects are often distorted for reasons similar to 
what engenders discrete group discrimination. 
For example, the decision to build a highway through a poor neigh-
borhood in order to reduce the driving time of suburbanites to downtown 
offices may have more destructive impacts on the neighborhood re-
sidents than what is captured through more conventional evaluations. A 
conventional approach would be to measure what individuals would be 
willing to accept as payment to suffer the additional noise and pollution, 
or what compensation would induce them to sell their house. There are 
various statistical methodologies available to derive these estimates. I73 
Though these estimates measure some loss to the neighborhood individu-
als, they are unlikely to capture other losses peculiar to that particular 
neighborhood environment. Perhaps the neighborhood is one of immi-
grants from a particular region of the world, for whom the community is 
an important source of support both psychologically and socio-economi-
cally. The welfare loss of the destruction of their neighborhood is not 
going to be captured by statistical measures of what price people typi-
170 See supra note 94 and accompanying text. Welfare here includes both pecuniary and 
ideational values. 
171 See discussion of Kalder-Hicks, supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text. 
172 Distributional impact here includes more than just the impact on the distribution of 
pecuniary benefits and costs among community members; it includes ideational and other fac-
tors that enter into the well-being of the individual, e.g., rights to privacy versus freedom of 
information. 
173 See generally Maureen L. Cropper & Wallace E. Oates, Environmental Economics: A 
Survey, 30 J. ECON. LIT. 675 (1992). 
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cally would be willing to accept to sell a house in a neighborhood such as 
this. Furthermore, even the best-intentioned policy-maker attempting to 
derive as accurately as possible the overall costs and benefits of a partic-
ular program may not even think about this dimension of cost. If the 
decision-maker is part of the governmental structure or on the executive 
level of a business enterprise, the decision-maker is more likely to be an 
assimilated individual, higher up in the socio-political hierarchy and not 
psychologically or financially dependant on support from the neighbor-
hood in which his or her home resides. More likely, this individual's 
support network is derived from the connection with others of similar 
economic and social status, who may be living in a variety of different 
physical neighborhoods. 
The lack of such awareness is one source of criticism for using the 
typical cost-benefit analysis in particular, and law and economic reason-
ing in general, for guiding social policy and private decision-making. It 
is true that much of the early inroads of economics into social evalua-
tions severely lacked the "humanistic" element and even advocated poli-
cies for decision-making that ignored consideration of these concerns.n4 
But there is a new generation of law and economic scholars who are 
endeavoring to incorporate much of the understanding offered by critics. 
As suggested earlier, economic reasoning is socially useful in that it 
leads to the range of beneficial choices that are the most socially advan-
tageous. I75 However, it still leaves to the decision-maker to select from 
among these beneficial choices, hopefully on a basis of fairness to the 
community members. Economic reasoning even advises us to examine 
our principles of fairness to make sure they do indeed serve the commu-
nity well-being and have not evolved into idolatrous watchwords that 
have lost their original merit. Ultimately, however, it is the principles of 
fairness and not economic reasoning that provide the parameters on value 
choices so that the distributional impact from these choices is "fair" as 
well as efficient. 
B. FEMINIST PRINCIPLES FOR EXTENDING THE PARAMETERS OF 
FAIRNESS 
How might feminist principles be of assistance? The most impor-
tant goal of feminism (as well as other outsider analyses) is to meet the 
needs of the discriminated group. When the principles arising from es-
tablished parameters of fairness fail to ensure that certain community 
members' welfare is considered, the techniques feminism offers serve to 
174 This has been poignantly portrayed in Ackerman & Heinzerling. supra note 121. at 
1554. 
175 Supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
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counter that failure. 176 The hypothetical of the highway through the im-
migrant neighborhood can demonstrate how the principles of feminist 
analysis can be of assistance. 
We begin with the concepts of the "dominant voice" and the voice 
of the "other"-the "excluded voice," which are the elements of an anal-
ysis of the dynamics of power. The dominant voice is the one in the 
position to make decisions; the voice of the "other," the "excluded 
voice," is the one whose needs and concerns are not addressed by the 
dominant analysis. I77 In our highway example, the dominant voice 
would be the mainstream perspectives valuing the building of the high-
way, and the "other" would be the immigrant population whose sensibili-
ties about the neighborhood to be destroyed are not reflected in the 
mainstream's evaluation of the project-in other words, the immigrant 
population is the one whose voice is excluded. The policy-makers, rep-
resenting the dominant voice, decide which ventures to pursue, evaluat-
ing the costs and benefits of each possibility, weighing and balancing in 
the process. Is the ethos of how to assess cost-benefit values responsive 
only to the concerns of someone like the assimilated, middle-class gov-
ernment policy-maker of our hypothetical? Or is there flexibility to re-
flect the concerns of others, different from those in governmental 
positions? 
Feminist analysis would highlight the difficulty someone from one 
background may have in appreciating the concerns of someone with an 
entirely different experience. 178 It is unlikely that the assimilated mid-
176 The other "outsider" scholarship has evolved many of these techniques to make them 
applicable to their own concerns though feminist analysis for the most part predates them. Of 
course, feminist analysis did not develop autonomously on its own or uniformly. It drew from 
and built on over time certain trends in philosophy and social sciences and there were several 
different schools of feminist thought. See, e.g., Maxine Eichner, On Postmodern Feminist 
Legal Theory, 36 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. I (2001) (discussing the trends and evolution of 
feminist theory and the different philosophies drawn upon as well as the references therein). 
177 See supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text. Long before modem feminist analy-
sis's advent, the role of the dominant voice was already implicitly recognized. For example, in 
1776, during the colonialists' efforts to break free from England, Abigail Adams wrote to her 
husband, John, future president of the soon-to-be United States: "I long to hear that you have 
declared an independency. And, by the way, in the new code of laws which I suppose it will 
be necessary for you to make, I desire you would remember the ladies and be more generous 
and favorable to them than your ancestors." ADAMS FAMILY CORRESPONDENCE, 370 (L.H. 
Butterfield et al. eds., 1963) (emphasis added) available at http://www.masshist.orgldig-
italadams. "I cannot say that I think you are very generous to the ladies, for, whilst you are 
proclaiming peace and good-will to men, emancipating all nations, you insist upon retaining an 
absolute power over wives." Id. at 420. 
178 This issue came up even in the discourse among feminislS regarding the different 
needs among themselves. For example, the needs of women of color are different than the 
needs of women of the dominant group, i.e., white middle-class women. This discussion also 
raised the question of whether there were characteristics that were "essential" to all women or 
not. See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, 
and Violence Against Women o/Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241 (1991); Angela P. Harris, Race 
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die-class government policy-maker of our hypothetical, without more, 
would be able to recognize the different needs of members of the poor 
immigrant community and incorporate those values in the weighing and 
balancing of the benefits and costs of the proposed highway project.179 
Furthermore, it is not only the differences in needs among individuals but 
also how those differences arise in the contexts in which the individuals 
function. "Context analysis"180 would recognize not only the needs of 
the particular immigrant but also how those needs are being met in the 
immigrant neighborhood in order to ascertain a truer indicator of the 
neighborhood's value. A feminist analysis would recognize that the 
principle of equality of treatment is not the same as equal treatment l81 
and that though an immigrant's needs may be different from those of the 
mainstream perspective, they are just as important to consider in any 
policy-making decision. Thus feminist analysis would extend the fair-
ness parameter of equality to recognize the full differences in the immi-
grants' needs and dictate that those differences enter the calculus of costs 
and benefits. 
The inclusion of the impact on non-mainstream individuals in any 
cost-benefit evaluations requires decision-makers to be alert to the possi-
bility of different sensibilities and become educated about them. How 
might the policy-makers become educated to different sensibilities? The 
feminist method would suggest "consciousness-raising." Though that 
term may have for some, a negative connotation and for others, a positive 
one,182 the concept's relevancy here is with respect to persons in power 
becoming aware of differences in others outside the power circle. 
Heightened awareness of the disparate impacts of various projects can be 
accomplished by drawing on different disciplines such as sociology, psy-
chology, and economics, and in particular, on experts in those fields who 
are sensitized to issues of difference and who can bring forward elements 
that otherwise might be ignored. Another approach that in fact often is 
employed is to hold hearings at which people potentially impacted can 
express their reactions and concerns. Feminists would characterize this 
as using "narrative" to "raise consciousness," gaining understanding by 
listening to people tell their story and hearing of their subjective 
experience. 
and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); Marlee Kline, Race, 
Racism and Feminist Legal Theory, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 115 (1989); Judy Scales-Trent, 
Commonalities: On Being Black and White, Different, and the Same, 2 YALE J. L. & FEMI-
NISM 305 (1990). 
179 Rhode, supra note 38. 
180 See supra note 47. 
181 See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text. 
182 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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Of course, the method to include differences in sensibilities in a 
cost-benefit reasoning process is still unresolved though much discussed. 
Proposals of what and how to include people's sentiments are not only 
very abstract,183 but are also not fully determinative of choice. Every 
method of inclusion involves some value choice on the part of the evalu-
ator. Ultimately, both the decision of how to include these factors as 
well as choosing from among the resulting options must rest on the 
evaluator's intuitive sense of justice. 184 Clearly that sense of justice con-
tains elements of the subjective, wherein lies the dimensions of choice 
that are political. 
Feminists would call attention, however, to what would be neces-
sary to be assured of the strong sense of justice relied upon. It would 
require more than the policy-maker being sensitive to differences among 
individuals and contexts; it would be more than having the knowledge 
and good intuition about how to incorporate those differences in a weigh-
ing and balancing process. Feminists would assert that the policy-maker 
needs to be motivated by a commitment to the principle of equality of 
treatment for all members of the community, with a strong understanding 
that equality of treatment is not the same as equal treatment. It is only 
through the coupling of the principle of equality of treatment with the 
sensitivity to the differences among members of the community and their 
contexts, that it is possible to invoke a strong sense of justice to guide the 
intuitive and political dimensions of decision-making. 
What if the decision-maker is not so inclined to make the efforts to 
acquaint him or herself with differences among individuals impacted by 
projects? What if the decision-maker is perhaps, instead, dismissive of 
the "other's" concerns? Feminists recognize that this can be and often is 
a problem. Such sensibility cannot be legislated alone, but must be in-
stilled in the individual. I85 To address these concerns, feminists argue 
for an atmosphere in the decision environment that promotes an "ethic of 
183 For an extensive discussion of non-determinative approaches as well as suggestions 
for determinative approaches, see generally Adler & Posner, supra note 82, and references 
therein. See also Matthew Adler, Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 U. PA. 
L. REv. 1371 (1998). 
184 Matthew D. Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure: A Welfarist Theory of Regula-
tion, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 241, 297 (2000) ("[W]e ought to strive for a 'reflective equilib-
rium' where the chosen view is the one best supported by intuitive judgments as well as 
systematic considerations"). 
185 President Kennedy's speeches sought to inspire what feminists would call an ethic of 
care. With regard to racial discrimination, he stated: 
This is not a sectional issue. Difficulties over ... discrimination exist in every city, 
in every State of the Union ... Nor is this a partisan issue ... men of goodwill and 
generosity should be able to unite regardless of party or politics ... This is not even 
a legal or legislative issue alone ... new laws are needed ... but law alone cannot 
make men see right. We are confronted primarily with a moral issue ... The heart 
of the question is whether all Americans are to be afforded equal rights and equal 
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care" for the needs of others, particularly for those whose needs are dif-
ferent from the decision-makers themselves. Obviously, to instill in an 
individual a sensibility he or she is not inclined toward is not readily 
achieved. We can learn lessons from the techniques feminists evolved to 
instill in men an awareness of and concern for the needs of women. 
The methods of "consciousness-raising" suggest practical ap-
proaches, such as persons in positions of power becoming educated and 
more sophisticated with regard to unseen costs and benefits arising from 
differences among impacted individuals. 186 Attending seminars and con-
ferences modeled on those designed to raise awareness of gender con-
cerns can extend to more broad concepts of differences among impacted 
individuals in general. Another tactic is to incorporate into the decision-
making process the evaluations of an individual or a board who is spe-
cially trained to be sensitive to factors of differences, and whose respon-
sibility is to examine policy decisions for disparate impacts not readily 
observable. Creating an institutional "ethicist" instills a "raised con-
sciousness" in the decision process, rather than in the individual deci-
sion-makers, though nothing would preclude implementing strategies 
towards both ends. An in-house review process to address ethical and 
fairness concerns is already familiar in other contexts. The scientific 
community has implemented special review processes whereby scientific 
investigations that use human subjects are required to obtain approval in 
advance from a board trained in evaluating treatment and concern for 
human subjects. The purpose is to instill in the experiment, if not the 
experimenters, an ethic of care for the human subjects, a need for which 
the scientific community obviously felt necessary to fill. I87 Feminists 
opportunities, whether we are going to treat our fellow Americans as we want to be 
treated. 
President's Radio and Television Report to the American People on Civil Rights, PuB. PAPERS 
(June II, 1963), available at http://www.jfklibrary.orglj061163.htm. 
186 To a certain extent, there has already been efforts to adapt law and economic analysis 
itself to recognize the importance of taking into consideration differences among the impacted 
individuals. See, e.g., Frank & Sunstein, supra note 86; Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & 
Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1485-
87 (1998); Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions, 89 GEO. L. J. 1977 (2001); Sunstein, supra 
note 127; Cass R. Sunstein, Are Poor People Worth Less than Rich People? Disaggregating 
the Value of Statistical Lives (2004) (paper on file with author). 
187 See generally Paul Farmer & Nicole Gastineau Campos, New Malaise: Bioethics and 
Human Rights in the Global Era, 32 1. L. MED. & ETHICS 243 (2004). The authors there not 
only discuss the role of Institutional Review Boards but they also discuss the infamous Tus-
kegee Syphilis Study, in which the U.S. Public Health Service followed the lives of 600 poor 
African-American males, 2/3 of whom had syphilis, from 1932 to 1972 in order to study 
syphilis' effect. Though a cure for the disease, penicillin, was discovered in 1947, the Service 
never offered it to the subjects, even though the subjects joined the study on the presumption 
that they would be treated. Farmer and Campos's point is that despite the implementation of 
Institutional Review Boards, in the year 2000, the New England Journal of Medicine reported 
a study in Uganda of 415 HIV infected individuals to gauge the transmission of the virus in 
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also call for developing a sense of "connectedness" with the "other" to 
assist fostering an ethic of care. If feasible, for example, the decision-
makers themselves might meet with impacted individuals or visit im-
pacted areas so as to identify more readily with those affected. 188 
Greater human contact has long been known to give greater empathic 
understanding and appreciation for those different from ourselves. 
Thus, a feminist approach would cause the parameters of fairness to 
include more than the established applications of justice, such as equal 
protection, enforcement of promises, just compensation and rights of pri-
vacy; they would include the obligation to scrutinize for differences in 
needs among community members, which are then to be considered 
equally in assessments of fair decision-making. Including this obligation 
expands the parameters of fairness for evaluating the cost and benefits of 
an undertaking and in turn creates a more accurate picture of the distribu-
tional consequences of policy decisions. Moreover, expanding the pa-
rameters of fairness also further narrows the range of permissible 
efficiency choices, thereby circumscribing the degree to which the choice 
is political. Feminist principles can rectify, in these ways, much of the 
cause for criticisml890f the use of cost-benefit reasoning as well as law 
and economic analysis in general in public and private enterprise deci-
sion-making. 
C. FEMINIST PRINCIPLES IN THE CORPORATE DECISION PROCESS 
Thus far the focus has been on decision-making in general, there-
fore the analysis developed from feminist principles should apply to both 
private and public arenas. Much of the literature evaluating and critiqu-
ing law and economic approaches to decision processes, particularly with 
respect to cost-benefit reasoning, has focused on governmental decision-
making. The feminist approaches can be extended, though, to corporate 
and other business contexts as well. This section contains some addi-
tional refinements tailored specifically to the corporate environment and 
its underlying incentive structure. 
As already noted,190 firms' primary focus is on the profitability of 
the enterprise. Profits are the primary concern of shareholders since 
profits drive dividends and increase share value. Profits are also the pri-
mary concern of corporate management because, ultimately, manage-
ment's positions depend on shareholder satisfaction since shareholders 
heterosexual sex. None of the volunteers were offered treatment, nor were their healthy sex 
partners advised that the subjects were HIV positive. What is most startling is that 4 Institu-
tional Review Boards in the U.S. and Uganda approved this study and a data and safety moni-
toring board from the U.S. National Institutes of Health monitored their work. Id. 
188 See infra note 214. 
189 See, e.g., Heinzerling, supra note 74. 
190 See supra text accompanying notes 64-68. 
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elect the board of directors, who in turn appoint the rest of management. 
Traditionally, law and economics has argued that the process of corpo-
rate decisions maximizes social welfare because market forces cause 
firms, in seeking to enhance their own profits, to make choices that are 
consistent with society's. These arguments were premised on the fact 
that firms make their calculations regarding different ventures based on 
market prices so as to enhance their profits. The arguments were that 
these market prices reflect consumer choices under the constraints of the 
availability of resources. Therefore when firms seek to maximize their 
profits, they engage in a cost-benefit analysis in which the evaluations of 
the costs and benefits reflect consumer wishes and thereby enhance so-
cial welfare. 191 
The biases and distortions from using market prices in the firm's 
decision process have already been noted. 192 Market prices tend to re-
flect preferences of wealthier individuals, not to reflect social preferences 
for goods private markets cannot produce, and market forces do not en-
courage foundational ventures that are economically unprofitable in the 
short run but socially desirable for the long run. 193 The deterrence effect 
of lawsuits in the firm's cost-benefit calculation l94 also fails to capture 
fully social assessments of harm due to procedural and evaluation 
problems. Procedurally, the adversary system fails harmed individuals in 
obtaining an adequate remedy because of its costs, the inaccessibility of 
evidence, and the difficulties in identifying a defendant firm or being 
identified as a bona fide plaintiff. In addition, jury judgments are un-
likely to capture the full ramifications of the harm, in part because the 
focus is on the plaintiff and not the whole context, and because of those 
elements that are non-pecuniary and truly impossible to compensate in 
monetary terms. 195 
Considering the problematic aspects of evaluating costs and benefits 
noted by both mainstream and feminist analyses,196 it is not difficult to 
conclude that the current profit-driven corporate decision process deter-
mining what risk of harm to which the community should be exposed, 
becomes less than satisfactory for ensuring enhanced community welfare 
by society's standards. Driven by market prices and jury judgments, 
firms' decisions are likely to put individuals at greater risk of harm and 
have different distributional impacts than society would find tolerable or 
"fair." Furthermore, circumstances exist when society, regardless of the 
191 See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text. 
192 See supra text accompanying notes 81-84. 
193 [d. 
194 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
195 For a discussion of these issues from a feminist perspective, see Bender, supra note 
27. 
196 See, e.g., the source cited in supra notes 74-77, 82-84. 
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benefits, may not want to entertain the risks associated with a particular 
venture, or may evaluate the consequences of risk differently in different 
contexts. 197 The market-price, jury-judgment approach for evaluating 
cost and benefits does not have the capability to capture these social 
choices. 
These are not questions of trade-offs between efficiency and fair-
ness. Instead, they are questions regarding the selection from the possi-
ble Pareto Optimal or Superior choices. The concern is the basis for 
determining what is in fact Pareto Superior and how the firm selects 
which Pareto Superior projects to pursue. Once again, as with decision-
making in general, the firm's evaluation and decision process should 
have boundaries circumscribed by social parameters of fairness. 198 What 
solutions might feminist techniques offer in the specific context of the 
firm? 
Some feminist scholars propose that firms should abandon or at 
least reduce significantly the importance of profit-maximizing as a goal 
of the corporation. 199 Such a "fairness vs. efficiency" approach, how-
ever, would not necessarily offer a desirable solution. Whether decisions 
are driven by the profit motives of individual firms or by a more central-
ized government agency, some form of weighing and balancing must still 
be undertaken in order to choose which of the possible groupings of 
goods, services and ideational values the socio-economy is moving to-
wards. Losing those benefits that the market mechanism does offer of 
spreading myriads of micro-cost-benefit decisions among those inti-
mately involved in a particular product or service-either as a consumer 
or as a producer-would create a weight of bureaucratic decision-making 
that, at least by historical observation, has had crushing effects on even 
the most well-intentioned economies.2OO Not all of the impact of profit 
incentives and the use of market prices is completely contrary to social 
welfare. Market prices and responses to them do in fact convey consid-
197 For example, compare the choice to spend millions to rescue Baby Jessica McClure 
from the well she fell down and provide her with a bright future with the debate over whether 
to incur the cost of seatbelts for children when riding school buses. See supra note 80. See 
also Douglas A. Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural Transjonnation, and Comprehensive Ra-
tionality, 31 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 555 (2004) (suggesting different standards of choice 
other than the more traditional cost-benefit approach used in environmental law). 
198 See supra discussion accompanying notes 155-69. 
199 Lawrence E. Mitchell & Theresa A. Gabaldon, If I Only Had a Heart: Or, How Can 
We Identify a Corporate Morality, 76 TuL. L. REv. 1645, 1666-68 (2002). Though Mitchell 
does not identify himself as a feminist, Gabaldon does. She also points out in another article 
that in her assessment, Mitchell's analysis is often subconsciously feminist, or at least draws 
on feminist principles. See Theresa A. Gabaldon, Corporate Conscience and the White Man's 
Burden, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 944 (2002). 
200 For discussions regarding fonner centrally-planned economics transfonning to private 
markets, sec LYNNE L. DALLAS, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY: A SocIO-EcONOMIC ApPROACH ch. 
12 (2004). 
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erable information about society's preferences and does so extremely ef-
ficaciously. Instead, a better approach than attempting to abandon profit 
maximizing and market prices would be to conceive a manner by which 
firms will incorporate welfare-enhancing fairness values into their cost-
benefit reasoning process while still proceeding to make efficient 
decisions. 20 1 
The puzzle is how to imbue effectively the corporate decision pro-
cess with welfare and fairness concerns. When addressing the decision 
process of governmental policy-makers, there is already an implicit pre-
sumption that those policy-makers pursue a mandate to evaluate and con-
strain their selections from efficient choices based on welfare and 
fairness principles. When assessing the decision-process specific to the 
firm, however, analyses and recommendations have to consider the con-
text in which the decision process is made, and that context is profit-
maximization.202 
When exploring what applications of the feminist approach might 
be effective in influencing corporate conduct to comport more consist-
ently with social values, it is possible to tum to what has been imple-
mented in other contexts regarding other social concerns. Analyses 
addressing "market failures,"203 suggest assessing whether imposing fair-
ness concerns from outside the firm or inducing an environment internal 
to the firm stimulate incentives to incorporate those values. So for exam-
ple, the government provides, external to the market, certain goods and 
services that enhance social welfare that the market fails to produce, such 
as national defense and funding fundamental scientific research at uni-
versities, ventures that are too unprofitable or risky for private firms to 
undertake. The government creates incentives internal to the firm by 
giving tax deductions and tax subsidies to induce firms to develop envi-
ronmentally sound production techniques and to hire unprepared workers 
and train them. Some laws require firms to accommodate identified spe-
cific needs of various sectors of the community because the cost-benefit 
analyses that firms engage in using market prices leads to different, less 
socially desirable, conclusions. Examples are the Civil Rights Act of 
201 For a critique of legal treatments that encourage firms to only consider profit motives 
in their decision process instead of developing means for corporate social responsibility, see 
Williams, supra note 75. 
202 Other efforts integrating social values with corporate conduct include: LAWRENCE E. 
MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA'S NEWEST EXPORT (2001); Lynne L. Dal-
las, The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate Boards of Directors, 76 TuL. L. REv. 
1363 (2002); Claire Moore Dickerson, Corporations As Cities: Targeting the Nodes in Over-
lapping Networks, 29 J. CORP. LAW 533 (2004) (using sociology and network theory to inte-
grate theories of corporate social responsibility with theories of profit-maximizing behavior). 
203 See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text. 
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1964,204 the Clean Air Act,205 mandatory insurance provisions,206 Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act207 and the American With Disabilities 
Act.208 
Though particular concerns with specific industries or corporations 
ought to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, some general recommenda-
tions can be made. With respect to the firm's cost-benefit decisions, the 
contributions feminist theory can offer are analogous to its contributions 
to the parameters of fairness in general. Feminist techniques can suggest 
ways to induce the decision-makers to take account of the differences 
and needs of others, both in the firm's evaluative process of the cost and 
benefits of different projects and in its decisions as to which ventures to 
pursue. The feminist technique can provide guidance for developing ef-
fective means to imbue the internal corporate atmosphere with the "ethic 
of care" and suggest when it is appropriate to impose guidance externally 
to the firm. 
In order to develop an atmosphere that will induce an ethic of care, 
recommendations parallel to those suggested earlier regarding decision-
makers in general can be made. For example, to ensure meaningful cor-
porate social awareness, there could be a requirement that in order to sit 
on a Board of Directors, a member must become educated with respect to 
ethical and social concerns of that corporation's behavior and become 
sensitive to the potential differences in the needs of others who may be 
impacted by the corporation's conduct. This could be achieved by the 
development of seminars or workshops specifically tailored to issues the 
corporation is likely to encounter. Another would be to require at least 
one member of the Board be specially trained to be alert for ethical is-
sues in the corporation's decision processes.209 Legal responsibility can 
be assigned to the Board's "ethicist," i.e., a "fiduciary duty of ethical 
care," to monitor and ascertain that fairness values are in place at key 
levels of decision-making throughout the corporate hierarchy.210 Corpo-
204 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (2005). 
205 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2005). 
206 For example, see ALASKA STAT. § 28.22.011 (Michie 2005); D.C. CODE ANN. § 31-
2403 (2005); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:\OC-107 (2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-10-220 (2005). 
207 29 U.S.c. §§ 651-675, 677-78 (2005); 42 U.S.C. § 3142-1 (2005). 
208 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.c. §§ 12101-12213 (2005). 
209 This may prove to be unduly burdensome for small closely-held corporations who 
typically have a small number of members sitting on the Board or may have no members and 
the corporation is run by shareholders. In those instances, attendance to seminars alerting 
board members of the possibility of ethical concerns should satisfice. 
210 For an interesting discussion, drawing on the work of psychologist John M. Darley 
and sociologist Robert Jackall, noting that the ethical approaches of those at the head of an 
organization have a significant impact on the moral and legal behavior of employees down 
through the organizations' hierarchy, see Mitchell & Gabaldon, supra note 199, at 1653-62 
(citing ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS (1988); 
JOHN M. DARLEY, How ORGANIZATIONS SOCIALIZE INDrvIDUALS INTO EVILDOING, IN CODES 
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rations can be obligated to retain a review board that examines corporate 
decisions for proper evaluation of costs and benefits with regard to im-
pact on community members, similar to the board review requirements 
for scientific experiments involving human subjects.211 
One problem noted by many scholars is the empathic detachment of 
corporate decision-makers from the individuals their decisions impact, 
corporate decisions often being based on statistical analysis of "faceless 
individuals."212 As with decision-makers in general,213 application of a 
feminist method would recommend means of creating a sense of con-
nectedness with the other. "Connectedness" could be accomplished by 
requiring corporate management to hold public hearings regarding 
projects involving risk of harm, to meet personally with individuals po-
tentially impacted and visit personally the locations that the corporate 
activity will take place, thereby creating an empathic connection between 
those who run the corporation and those affected by the corporation.214 
Appointing to the Board of Directors, representatives of potentially im-
pacted individuals, such as employees of the firm215 and members of the 
community in which the corporation operates, will introduce the con-
cerns of the "other" into the discussion. Corporations could be obligated 
to submit projects to external review committees composed of commu-
nity members, consumers, and others trained to recognize potential risk 
and fairness problems. The goal of all these approaches is to facilitate a 
development of social conscience in the corporate atmosphere so that the 
firm may avoid undertaking ventures that may possibly create an undue 
risk of harm. 
If the likelihood is high that, even with all the above suggestions in 
place, voices of affected "others" would still not be adequately repre-
sented, then a feminist consideration would suggest that a statutory ap-
OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS 13 (David M. Messick & Ann 
E. Tenbrunsel, eds. 1996». 
211 See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
212 See, e.g., Bender, supra note 27; Heinzerling, supra note 74; Mitchell & Gabaldon, 
supra note 199. 
213 See supra text accompanying note 188. 
214 In the context of mass torts, Leslie Bender suggested that corporate officers be re-
quired actually to participate personally in the caregiving of their victims. She argues that this 
requirement would not only imbue the corporate officers with a greater sense of responsibility 
for their decisions to put others in the way of risk of harm (instead of just "buying" their way 
out of it by having the corporation pay monetary damages) but would also instill in them a 
greater ethic of care that might cause them pause before they make decisions to risk the lives 
of others in the future. See Bender, supra note 27. 
215 See, e.g., Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corpo-
rate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 899 (1993); 
Fauver & Fuerst, supra note 62 (demonstrating empirically that not only does the presence of 
employees on corporate boards have their concerns address but the corporation operates more 
efficiently and increases in value). 
68 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 15:1 
proach may be necessary.216 The question of whether to have an external 
rule (such as a statute) or internal incentive mechanisms (such as the 
requirement of an "ethicist" on the Board of Directors) is not decisive for 
all circumstances or even necessarily mutually exclusive. The advantage 
of a statutory requirement is that it guarantees that particular needs will 
be met. The disadvantage is that it is difficult to craft a statute to be well 
tailored to all circumstances, being over-inclusive in some and under-
inclusive in others. The advantage of promoting ethical concerns from 
within the corporation is that the corporate-decision makers can then tai-
lor their decisions to be more fine-tuned with the needs of those im-
pacted. The disadvantage is that the firm may still attempt to shirk its 
responsibility. An external community review board can serve as a mid-
dle ground in that its oversight can reduce the likelihood that firms will 
choose policies that deviate too far from acceptable social levels of risk 
and yet the board can remain flexible enough to allow the firm to take 
courses of action that encompass the needs of others in a manner that is 
specific to the situation at hand. Of course even this circumstance has its 
disadvantage, probably the most serious one is the potential for corrup-
tion, as in any institutional process. 
Feminist approaches may also enhance the effectiveness of lawsuits 
to deter firms from making socially unacceptable decisions with respect 
to risk. A difficulty in general of relying on lawsuits' deterrent effect is 
that firms are in possession of the information and evidence necessary to 
ascertain whether they adopted acceptable approaches to risk. Firms do 
not have the incentive to be forthcoming which impedes a plaintiff-vic-
tim's ability to be heard properly in court. Feminist analysis would rec-
ognize this as an imbalance of power, that is, there is an imbalance of 
power in control of critical information and would make recommenda-
tions to equalize that balance. For example, one feminist author has sug-
gested reallocating the burden of proof to make the firm more compliant 
with disclosure, thereby putting the plaintiff on a more equal footing in 
the courtroom. The author recommends that, upon a plaintiff s limited 
showing that a harm has occurred and that it is related to a firm's activi-
ties, the burden of proof should shift from the plaintiff to the firm to 
216 For example, the State of Maryland passed a statute requiring insurance companies to 
provide two days of hospital stay for women who just gave birth even if there were no compli-
cations. The insurance companies' own cost-benefit calculations were that one day was all 
that was statistically necessary. The costs of providing a second day of hospital care for all 
mothers giving birth was in excess of the cost of caring for the potential complications arising 
from premature discharge. However, the State decided that the value of the possible harm to 
the child, if problems emerged on the second day after birth, was greater than the measure of 
medical costs to care for it. See MD. CODE ANN., INS., § 15-812 (2002 & Supp. 2005). 
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demonstrate that the firm did not make socially unreasonable decisions to 
risk harm.217 
Creating transparency regarding decision processes with social im-
plications can be mandated, for example, through SEC disclosure re-
quirements.218 The corporation is then subject to public scrutiny and, in 
particular, to potential scrutiny by those representing impacted individu-
als. All participants in the corporate decision process will know that they 
will be held accountable for their decisions, and accountable based on 
social principles of welfare-enhancing fairness, and not just on profit-
maximizing goals of the corporation.219 This will create a form of social 
deterrence not available through the marketplace mechanisms. This will 
also increase the shifting of power balances between plaintiff and defen-
dant when the corporate activities are associated with harm. These pos-
sibilities foster an ethical "corporate conscience" to act as constraints in 
the evaluation and selection process of corporate decisions.22o 
Thus, we can see that feminist principles, originally designed to ad-
dress the concerns of women, can be used to address the excluded voice 
of victims of corporate harm as well. The approaches follow those de-
veloped over time to gain equality for women. Some of the techniques 
are to implement change from within the organization and others are to 
impose change from without. Some of the techniques are designed to 
foster an ethic of care so that corporate decision-makers will provide 
their own constraints on the decisions they make with regard to putting 
others at the risk of harm. Other techniques serve to constrain the range 
of risk by incorporating outside sensibilities to the decision-process. Ap-
plying feminist analyses to the corporate decision context assists in high-
lighting not only how corporate conduct might diverge from socially 
acceptable behavior but also offers means to stimulate corporate activity 
to align more with society's values. 
217 Bender, supra note 27. 
218 Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social 
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REv. 1197 (1999); see also Claire Moore Dickerson, Ozymandias 
as Community Project: Managerial/Corporate Social Responsibility and the Failure ofTrans-
parency, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1035 (2003). 
219 Allowances can be made for those corporate decisions that need to be held secret for a 
time to serve competition needs in the market place. 
220 Lorenzo Sacconi, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a Model of "Extended" 
Corporate Governance. An Explanation Based on the Economic Theories of Social Contract, 
Reputation and Reciprocal Conformism, Liuc Papers n. 142, Serie Etica, Diritto ed Economia 
10, suppl. a febbraio 2004 (on file with author) (for an analysis of the European efforts to 
incorporate ethics into business conduct and arguments that properly implemented self-regula-
tion incentives for ethical conduct can be effective). 
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CONCLUSION 
This article provides resolutions to a number of conundrums that 
have vexed policy-makers and scholars for some decades. The most sig-
nificant conclusion is that efficiency and fairness concerns do not con-
flict but rather mutually support each other in the goal of maximizing 
social welfare. This is contrary to the more widely-held view by both 
advocates of law and economic reasoning and those favoring deontologi-
cal concerns that a trade-off between fairness and efficiency is inevitable. 
This article demonstrates how the coalescence of the two frameworks, 
the cultivation of fairness with law and economics' efficiency maximiza-
tion, yields greater enhancements of social welfare by simultaneously 
satisfying the criteria of both. The analysis also points out that more than 
one state of the world likely exists that satisfies both sets of criteria. 
Furthermore, the selection from among those various possible states is a 
political choice not determined by any objective criteria, but one to be 
chosen by the subjective criteria of the decision-maker. 
The article first delineates how law and economic analysis, using 
Pareto Optimality as the criterion, can determine a complete set of all 
possible efficient states. It then points out that in selecting from among 
those efficient states one can rely only on deontological approaches. 
However, these de ontological concerns are qualified in that their imple-
mentation must actually be welfare enhancing and not just abstract ideal-
istic concepts unanchored in any way to welfare considerations. This 
view of deontological applications recognizes dimensions and roles for 
fairness evaluations in welfare maximization beyond the narrower defini-
tion of fairness implied by the work of Kaplow and ShavelJ.221 
The analysis then addresses how deontological concerns influence 
the selections from among the preferred efficient states. This article sug-
gests that deontological concerns manifest themselves by creating bound-
aries of ethical conduct outside of which there can be no socially 
acceptable selection of efficient states. These ethical boundaries are la-
beled here as the parameters of fairness. Examples of parameters of fair-
ness are the requirement of equitable treatment, privacy, due process, and 
other fairness concerns. Though these parameters of fairness narrow the 
range of acceptable efficient states to those that also satisfy social ethical 
norms, since they are only boundaries, they do not determine one unique 
state. The intersection of efficiency criteria with the boundaries created 
by the parameters of fairness yields fewer but nevertheless still numerous 
potential optimal choices, the selection from which can only be deter-
mined by the political values of the decision-maker. 
221 See supra Part VI. B. 2. 
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An application of this theoretical framework to a particularly perva-
sive problem, the excessive incidence of corporate harm, demonstrates 
the approach's usefulness. The article shows how law and economics 
analysis can describe why corporate harm occurs; it stems from the 
firm's use of cost-benefit reasoning in its pursuit of maximizing profits. 
Law and economics, however, cannot provide a widely accepted solution 
to the excessive incidence of corporate harm. The reason is that the 
source of undue incidence of corporate harm lies in the social applica-
tions of the parameters of fairness and not in the application of efficiency 
criteria. The deficiencies in social policy with respect to corporate harm 
are not due to shortcomings in economic analysis but rather in the failure 
of the parameters of fairness to circumscribe adequately permissible 
harmful conduct. 
To provide a resolution to the incidence of undue corporate harm, 
this article turns to feminist theory, not to address any gender concerns, 
but to draw from its analytic tools. First, the application of the feminist 
method uncovers the failings in the decision-making environment that 
allow for choices of excessive corporate harm. The feminist method then 
offers remedies for these failings. In particular, feminist analysis shows 
that excessive corporate harm arises because of the failure to consider 
what constitutes the well-being of those who are outside the periphery of 
the decision-makers' awareness. The feminist method then proposes 
general principles and specific techniques to incorporate the concerns of 
those who are excluded from the decision-makers' calculations. These 
general principles suggest an ethical requirement that decision-makers 
use due diligence to become aware of those whose concerns do not natu-
rally fall within the typical decision calculations. This ethical require-
ment is, in effect, an expansion of the parameters of fairness; it yields 
additional boundaries on and further narrows the range of possible effi-
cient states from which a decision-maker may select. The principles un-
derlying the techniques that the feminist method would suggest are 
premised on the feminist concepts of the "ethic of care," the "voice of the 
other" (that is, the "excluded voice") and the ethical obligation of inclu-
sion, in particular, the inclusion of the needs of the "other." For the 
purposes of redressing corporate harm, the inclusion of the "other" 
would be to include the concerns of those outside the norms of corporate 
consideration. As a result, the feminist approach offers a resolution to 
the problem of excessive corporate harm through the expansion of the 
parameters of fairness and not through rejecting law and economic con-
tributions to increasing social welfare. Collaterally, this article demon-
strates that two disparate jurisprudences normally seen as antagonistic to 
72 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 15: 1 
one another-feminist analysis and law and economics-can in fact cre-
ate a synergy by resolving issues that each alone is not able to address 
satisfactorily. 
